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Publish/subscribe (pub/sub) is an attractive communication paradigm for large-scale distributed applica-
tions running across multiple administrative domains. Pub/sub allows event-based information dissemina-
tion based on constraints on the nature of the data rather than on pre-established communication channels.
It is a natural fit for deployment in untrusted environments such as public clouds linking applications across
multiple sites. However, pub/sub in untrusted environments lead to major confidentiality concerns stem-
ming from the content-centric nature of the communications. This survey classifies and analyzes different
approaches to confidentiality preservation for pub/sub, from applications of trust and access control models
to novel encryption techniques. It provides an overview of the current challenges posed by confidentiality
concerns and points to future research directions in this promising field.
CCS Concepts: •General and reference → Surveys and overviews; •Software and its engineer-
ing → Publish-subscribe / event-based architectures; •Security and privacy → Cryptography;
Access control; Privacy-preserving protocols; •Computer systems organization → Distributed archi-
tectures;
General Terms: Algorithms, Security, Design
Additional Key Words and Phrases: publish/subscribe, confidentiality
1. INTRODUCTION
Publish/Subscribe (pub/sub) systems [Eugster et al. 2003] allow disseminating information
in distributed systems from several sources (the publishers) to different subsets of interested
users (the subscribers). Publishers produce data in the form of publications. Subscribers
express their interests for receiving a subset of publications by issuing subscriptions composed
of predicates, or constraints. Any publication matching a given subscription’s constraints is
delivered to the corresponding subscriber. The most common approach in pub/sub systems
is to consider that the matching procedure is performed by a set of dedicated machines,
the brokers. The brokers, typically organized in an overlay, store the subscriptions received
from subscribers and filter incoming publications, which are forwarded to the interested
subscribers. Communication between publishers and subscribers is decoupled in time and
space. Publishers do not need to know the identity of the interested subscribers, nor do they
need to synchronize with them. The task of determining the subset of interested subscribers
and routing the publications is the responsibility of the pub/sub system itself. A generic
broker-based pub/sub system is illustrated in Figure 1.
1.1. Pub/sub paradigms
Pub/sub systems are typically classified according to the model they allow for subscriptions
constraints. The two main models are topic-based and content-based.
In topic-based pub/sub, subscribers declare one or several topics of interest among a list
of predefined topics. Topic-based pub/sub is a form of group communication. A publication
is tagged with a topic and propagated to all the subscribers that registered a subscription
c©ACM, 2016. This is the author’s version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your
personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version was published in ACM Computing Surveys,
Volume 49, Issue 2, (November 2016), http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2940296
Author’s Version - c©ACM, 2016
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
09
40
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 M
ay
 20
17
2 Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
B
B
B
stored
subscriptions
publishers subscribers
P
header
payload
publication
P
pub/sub middleware
S
criteria
subscription
P
matching
publication
Pbroker
Fig. 1: A generic broker-based pub/sub system.
for that topic. The main drawback of topic-based pub/sub is its low expressiveness1 caused
by this use of predefined topics. Implementations of this model can however often be
optimized for high throughput and scalability, e.g., by pre-organizing subscribers for the
same topic in a distributed dissemination structure [Castro et al. 2002; Patel et al. 2009;
ZMQ 2015]. Examples of topic-based pub/sub systems include Apache Hedwig [Hedwig 2012],
Bayeux [Zhuang et al. 2001], MQTT [MQTT 2014], Rappel [Patel et al. 2009], Scribe [Castro
et al. 2002], Sprinkler [Geng and van Renesse 2013], TIB/RendezVous [Oki et al. 1993] and
ZeroMQ [ZMQ 2015].
In content-based pub/sub, the set of interested subscribers is determined at runtime based
on the content of publications. The content is typically summarized or represented by a header
that contains a collection of values over some attributes. Subscriptions can filter publications
of interest via a set of predicates, which are constraints over these attributes. This paradigm
is strictly more expressive than topic-based pub/sub: a subscriber is no longer limited to
a predefined topic and can combine different types of constraints on any of the attributes.
Examples of content-based pub/sub include Elvin [Segall et al. 2000], Gryphon [Strom
et al. 1998; Astley et al. 2004], Hermes [Pietzuch and Bacon 2002], JEDI [Cugola et al.
2001], PADRES [Li et al. 2005; Jacobsen et al. 2010], Rebecca [Mu¨hl 2001; Mu¨hl 2002],
Siena [Carzaniga et al. 2001], StreamHub [Barazzutti et al. 2013; Barazzutti et al. 2014] and
XNET [Chand and Felber 2004].
As topic-based pub/sub can be modeled as a special and simpler case of content-based
pub/sub where the allowed constraint is a single equality over a single attribute, we will
use the term constraint(s) to denote either cases in the remainder of this section (unless
otherwise specified).
The expressiveness and flexibility of pub/sub has led to broad range of applications.
Applications include the dissemination of stock quotes [Machanavajjhala et al. 2008], E-Health
information systems [Ion et al. 2010a; Eze et al. 2010], network management systems [Martin-
Flatin et al. 1999; Perera and Gannon 2009], RSS feed monitoring [Rose et al. 2007], and
algorithmic trading with complex event processing [Pietzuch et al. 2004; Adi et al. 2006].
1.2. Pub/sub confidentiality
The focus of this survey is on confidentiality, one of the main security concerns arising in multi-
party pub/sub networks, and more generally in communication networks where untrusted
parties must do some computation on sensitive data. This is of increasing importance with
the advent of externalized computing resources (in particular, cloud computing) and the
associated possibility to offer pub/sub as a service. We exemplify confidentiality challenges
with two seminal applications.
1The capacity of a query language to express more or less complex queries (e.g., conjunctions vs. simple
terms, multi-dimensionality, etc.).
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Our first application is a stock quote notification system, and is widely used in the
literature (e.g., [Machanavajjhala et al. 2008]). Publishers are stock markets issuing trading
quotes. Subscribers are investors or other financial institutions wishing to receive quotes
according to their various interests, such as all quotes above a certain volume of exchange,
quotes with the highest daily variation, etc. A set of agencies provides pub/sub services by
filtering quotes received from publishers according to the constraints defined by subscribers.
In this context, publications are public data, but subscriptions may contain highly sensitive
information. Indeed, leaking the subscriptions originating from a customer could reveal
information about its investment strategies and be used by competitors. We point out
that the encryption of subscriptions using standard techniques before submission to the
broker is inadequate: the pub/sub system must be able to route publications based on the
constraints set in these subscriptions. If the constraints are encrypted such that they are
completely opaque to the pub/sub system, routing is impossible and all filtering will have to
be performed at the subscribers’ side. Ensuring confidentiality in such a system is therefore
a compromise between the ability to accurately route publications and the risk of leaking
information.
E-Health information systems [Ion et al. 2010a; Eze et al. 2010] is another application
that can benefit from content-based pub/sub as a communication layer. Such systems link
actors of public and private health sectors (physicians, hospitals, clinics, pharmacists). These
actors share files about patients to ensure a timely dissemination of cases, tests, etc. A
typical publisher could be an emergency unit receiving persons in critical condition. In
this case, publications include the identity of the patients along with the content of their
medical files. This information must be disseminated to various hospital units, possibly
geographically separated and in independent administrative domains, where the patient can
be moved when his condition stabilizes or where tests have to be performed or analyzed.
These healthcare units can submit subscriptions to the pub/sub system to take act of new
cases, organize and schedule the patient admission and treatment sessions. While a part
of the publication (the medical file), can be encrypted using end-to-end encryption, some
other parts must be used for routing the publication between authorized and interested
parties. The publication headers (name, address of the patient, nature of the test, etc.) are
highly sensitive information. Subscriptions are also highly sensitive information: they can
reveal, for instance, which patient is treated by which clinic or for which type of ailment.
The leakage of such information can lead to serious consequences: one can imagine an
insurance company observing such data and refusing to cover patients undergoing certain
tests. Furthermore, confidentiality management can get even more complex if the e-Health
infrastructure interconnects with other systems through pub/sub communication, like a law
enforcement agency gathering information about victims of a suspicious accident. Again,
we note that there is a compromise between the ability to route messages based on some
information and potential leakages to unauthorized parties.
A characteristic of both scenarios above is that the pub/sub service provider can be a
third party belonging to an administrative domain different from the ones of publishers and
subscribers. This third party may not be trusted to access sensitive data. Furthermore, the
use of virtualization and the lack of control on resource placement and communication in
public clouds might pose serious confidentiality threats. For instance, research has shown
that exploits at the hypervisor level [Ristenpart et al. 2009; Somorovsky et al. 2011] or at
the CPU cache level [Liu et al. 2015] when virtual machines are collocated can be used to
gather private information from a virtual machine running on a public cloud. Since the
support infrastructure may be prone to attacks, confidentiality should be provided by design
such that even unauthorized and accidental access to information manipulated by pub/sub
brokers cannot cause critical data leaks.
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1.3. Survey motivation
Several surveys have been written about various aspects in pub/sub systems, all having
different aims than the present one. [Eugster et al. 2003] positions the pub/sub paradigm
with respect to other communication paradigms. [Baldoni et al. 2009] focuses on scalable
event routing and its relation with the underlying overlay network. [Filho and Redmiles
2005] concentrates on software engineering with the purpose of achieving versatility in
pub/sub middleware. [Liu and Plale 2003] considers overlays topologies. [Martins and
Duarte 2010] focuses on routing algorithms. None of these surveys targets confidentiality in
pub/sub systems. There are a few contributions covering and classifying some security and
confidentiality aspects of pub/sub systems [Wang et al. 2002; Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006;
Bacon et al. 2010], which we cover in later sections of this article.
Confidentiality problems arising in pub/sub systems are acutely relevant, and it can be
challenging to view the wide and disparate array of solutions in proper context. Hence,
our first objective for this survey is to provide a clear and comprehensive overview of the
state-of-the-art tools developed for this purpose. The second objective is to describe and
assess how providing confidentiality affects the core conception and performance of pub/sub
systems. Finally, our third objective is to point out the challenges that must be overcome
before confidentiality can be efficiently supported in large-scale pub/sub systems, and more
generally to shed light on the relevant research directions in this emerging and promising
field.
1.4. Organization
The organization of this survey is as follows. Section 2 summarizes and classifies the various
flavors of confidentiality in pub/sub systems considered in the literature. To do so, we
introduce a generic functional pub/sub system model encompassing most of the existing
work. Section 3 surveys confidentiality-preserving pub/sub solutions based on security models
and non-specific security tools, allowing the core matching operation to be performed only
in trusted domains. Section 4 surveys solutions specific to pub/sub that provide the ability
to perform matching operations on encrypted data in untrusted domains. Finally, we discuss
the current challenges and unexplored issues in Section 5.
2. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUB/SUB
Confidentiality is the property for a communication system to prevent the disclosure of
sensitive information carried in the exchanged messages. Confidentiality in the context of
pub/sub systems is approached in several ways, which we overview in this section.
In Subsection 2.1, we describe a generic system model for content-based pub/sub systems,
that can be simply restrained to match the topic-based model. This model is used as the
unsecured basis for the pub/sub security solutions we review. In Subsection 2.2, we discuss the
importance and implication of trust assumptions over the domains and entities of a pub/sub
system, and illustrate these using a seminal example in Subsection 2.3. In Subsection 2.4 we
propose a classification of pub/sub confidentiality properties. Finally, in Subsection 2.5, we
distinguish the two main research directions towards providing confidentiality in pub/sub
systems.
2.1. System model
A typical content-based pub/sub system is composed of a broker infrastructure that provides
routing services, and two sets of clients: publishers that submit publications to the system and
subscribers that submit subscriptions with the intent to receive the publications that match
their interests. Brokers receive and store subscriptions from the subscribers that connect
to them. They also typically maintain routing tables towards other brokers, forming an
overlay of brokers. Upon the reception of a publication from a publisher or another broker, a
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broker checks its locally stored subscriptions and the entries in its routing table for matching
interests (the matching operation). For each matching subscription, the broker sends a
notification to the corresponding, locally attached subscriber. For a matching routing table
entry, the broker forwards the publication to the corresponding broker. We assume without
loss of generality that all brokers may perform the three operations of matching, notification
and routing publications. We consider in the following the general case of a content-based
pub/sub system. This can be adapted to a topic-based model simply by reducing the
expressiveness of subscriptions to simple equality matching over a single attribute.
The structure of a publication includes a header that defines the attributes on which
routing is based and their respective values (e.g., price = 300, name = “ACME”, date =
2015/6/1), as well as a payload that contains the complete data to be delivered (e.g., a graph
showing the daily variations of the stock value). Note that in practice a publication can be
represented only by its header and the payload is optional. Also, the number of attributes
effectively present in a publication header can be lower than the total possible number in
the publication schema which we refer as publication dimensions.
The structure of a subscription consists in a set of constraints on the attributes (e.g.,
price > 300 and name = “EMCA”). In this survey, when no distinction is necessary between
subscriptions and publications (in particular for encryption purposes), an attribute from a
publication header and a constraint from a subscription are both denoted as a message field.
In order to efficiently match publications against large set of stored subscriptions, pub/sub
systems often leverage containment relations between subscriptions. A subscription contains
another subscription if it is more general, i.e., if publications matching the contained
subscription always match the containing subscription (e.g., “S1: stockquote > 100” contains
“S2: stockquote > 300”). Determining containment relations between subscriptions allows
building efficient data structures to store subscriptions and match incoming publications.
An example of such a structure is a partially ordered set (or poset), where precedence
relations in the poset correspond to containment relations between subscriptions. When
a subscription is known not to match a publication, all its descendants in the poset can
be marked as not matching as well (a process known as negative matching). Similarly, a
subscription known to match can mark all subscriptions that contain it as matching as
well, by following containment order relations in the reverse direction (positive matching).
Containment is largely used by state-of-the art pub/sub systems [Li et al. 2005; Jacobsen
et al. 2010; Carzaniga et al. 2001; Chand and Felber 2004]. It is shown in [Barazzutti et al.
2012] and other work that using containment may reduce the number of actual subscription
matching evaluation by up to an order of magnitude compared to the naive one-by-one
evaluation of the set of subscriptions, yielding important performance and scalability gains.
The majority of the work on confidentiality in content-based pub/sub systems follows
the model described above, which fits naturally a deployment as an infrastructure service
running in the cloud or on dedicated servers. When one of the security schemes reviewed
in this survey considers a slightly different system model, we explicit the difference in the
text. The system model for pub/sub that differs the most from a broker-based system
is the use of peer-to-peer techniques, where publishers and subscribers self-organize in a
broker-less overlay in order to perform the matching, routing and notification. Examples
include Meghdoot [Gupta et al. 2004] and Ferry [Zhu and Hu 2007] based on distributed
hash tables, Sub-2-Sub [Voulgaris et al. 2006] and [Costa et al. 2003] using gossip-based
protocols, and specific overlays such as R-trees [Bianchi et al. 2007]. While there are less
published solutions addressing confidentiality in peer-to-peer pub/sub, we include relevant
work in this area in our review and explicitly detail the system model differences when
applicable.
Author’s Version - c©ACM, 2016
6 Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
Hospital A internal departments
name: John Smith
Publication
age: 29
injury: bone fracture
cause: car accident
insurance provider: X
treatment costs: $500
Emergency 
Unit
Neurology
Cardiology
attribute A = X
Subscription
cause = car accident
Subscription 2
name: John Smith
Publication
age: 29
injury: bone fracture
cause: car accident
<insurance provider>
<treatment costs>
Hospital B internal departments
Orthopedics
Pediatrics
injury = bone fracture
Subscription 1
name: John Smith
Publication
age: 29
injury: bone fracture
cause: car accident
insurance provider: X
treatment costs: $500
e-Health broker infrastructure 
(public cloud)
Police broker infrastructure 
(private cloud)
Police internal departments
<name>
Publication
<age>
<injury>
<cause>
<insurance provider>
<treatment costs>
name: John Smith
Publication
age: 29
injury: bone fracture
cause: car accident
<insurance provider>
<treatment costs>
B
B
B
<some field>
Subscription 1
<some field>
Subscription 2
B
B
B
Traffic control
Criminal 
investigations
cause = car accident
Subscription 2
Subs i n 2
<attribute B>
field accessible in cleartext
<encrypted field>
host (publisher or subscriber)
B broker
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sumptions for accessing the data.
2.2. Threat models
The starting point for research on confidentiality is the definition of a threat model linked to
the system model described above. We identify in this subsection the commonalities and
differences among the threat models found in the literature.
The behavior generally considered is that of honest-but-curious entities. Under this
assumption, entities (publishers, subscribers, brokers) are considered untrusted to access
the sensitive information but act according to the system specification (i.e., they are not
malicious). In particular, they will not replay, delete or forge messages. However, they wish
to collect any information allowing them to access restricted content in the exchanged
messages, or equivalently provide this ability to external entities. The published work we
review define threat models that share the following traits: the system functionality (routing
publications according to submitted subscriptions), the roles of the entities (subscribers,
publishers and brokers), the data that is manipulated (publications and subscriptions) and
the honest-but-curious behavior. Differences in the threat models lie in the trust assumptions
that are made, and in the granularity with which these trust assumptions are set. Trust
assumptions explicitly separate entities forming the pub/sub system as trusted and untrusted
for accessing specific pub/sub data (e.g., particular sets of fields in pub/sub messages). The
threat models of the work we review consider that untrusted entities do not collude in order
to break confidentiality, e.g., by sharing the collected information in order to form a more
powerful attack.
2.3. Motivating example: extended e-Health infrastructure
Trust assumptions often derive from the potentially complex relationships between different
administrative domains. To illustrate this, we describe an extension of the e-Health use case
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introduced in Section 1.2. Figure 2 presents sample message flows and identifies, for each
administrative domain, the pub/sub data that needs to be protected against untrusted nodes
in that domain. Each hospital is part of a separate domain. It publishes patient files for new
cases, and subscribes to take act of new cases from other hospitals. Hospitals are trusted to
access the publications and subscriptions in their local domain (e.g., when sending the file
between two internal departments). An e-Health pub/sub service implemented by a broker
infrastructure allows communication between hospitals that are part of the countrywide
public health system. This infrastructure can be hosted on a public cloud; it is then untrusted
for any access to pub/sub data. In particular, this prohibits hospitals from sending their
subscriptions constraints and publication headers in the clear to this domain for routing
purposes. A second broker infrastructure is used by police services for internal and external
communication. This infrastructure connects to the e-Health system in order to collect
information such as the name, age and type of injury of victims involved in specific cases
such as car accidents. A confidentiality policy requires however that some information from
the patient files, for instance the cost of the treatment or the insurance provider, remains
hidden to the police. Unlike the e-Health system, the broker infrastructure of the police is not
deployed on a public cloud but on privately owned servers. Consequently, the brokers in this
domain can be trusted to access the subscriptions constraints and some of the publication
attributes, and use these in the clear for routing, although publication attributes that fall
under the confidentiality policy must remain hidden.
This example illustrates the pairwise relationships between pub/sub entities in a given
domain and the data that is exchanged. On the one hand, there are functional requirements
that are dictated by the role of the entity: brokers need to perform matching and routing
operations between subscriptions and publications, whereas publishers and subscribers do
not. On the other hand, trust assumptions dictate what pub/sub data should be available
in each domain: entities in one domain may not be trusted to read any of the message
content (e.g., the brokers of the e-Health system) but the same message can be partially
accessed as it enters a different domain (e.g., the police broker infrastructure). The content
of publications and subscriptions can thus be classified as follows:
• routable and non-routable fields based on the necessity, in a specific domain, to use the
content of the header fields for routing the messages;
• sensitive and non-sensitive fields based on the need for protection against confidentiality
threats according to the trust assumptions made in each domain (e.g., the name of the
patient is a sensitive field in the e-Health system infrastructure, but it is non-sensitive in
the police broker infrastructure).
We illustrate in Figure 3 how publication fields vary as a message passes through the various
domains in the e-Health infrastructure. Note that the purpose of this example is to be simple
but general enough to cover the assumptions and models found in the literature. It can
be generalized to more complex scenarios. For instance, we considered that all pub/sub
entities in a domain have the same role, a simplifying assumption that is generally used in
the literature and does not break generality.
2.4. Pub/sub confidentiality properties
We distinguish the three following confidentiality properties that apply to the different
natures and roles of the sensitive parts of pub/sub messages:
• Subscription confidentiality is the ability to hide part or all of the constraints of the
subscriptions when these subscriptions enter untrusted domains.
•Publication confidentiality is the protection of part or all of the information contained in
the headers of publications, which are used for routing against stored subscriptions.
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Fig. 3: Variation of publication field characteristics depending on the domains traversed.
• Payload confidentiality is the property of hiding the payload of the publications submitted
to the pub/sub system.
A separation of confidentiality properties in pub/sub systems was first proposed in [Wang
et al. 2002]. We note the following differences with our classification. First, Wang et al.
consider our publication confidentiality property as two separate properties, “information
confidentiality” and “publication confidentiality”, where information confidentiality protects
the headers of publications when manipulated by the brokers, and publication confidentiality
protects the entire publications against the subscribers that are not allowed to access
them. We argue that publication confidentiality for headers can be provided against any
untrusted system component, regardless of its nature. The second difference between our
classification and Wang et al.’s is that they do not consider payload confidentiality as
a separate confidentiality property. Since the payload is not used for routing purposes,
enforcing payload confidentiality is orthogonal to the specifics of pub/sub communications.
The payload can thus be encrypted using classical encryption techniques before entering
the untrusted domain and decrypted when re-entering a trusted domain, provided that the
appropriate key distribution has been performed.
Subscription and publication confidentiality must be enforced through encryption of
the corresponding sensitive parts. Classical encryption can be used to enforce these two
properties before pub/sub messages enter untrusted domains, however the brokers present
in the untrusted domain lose the ability to perform routing operations on the sensitive parts.
Classical encryption is thus only applicable to non-routable fields. A class of encryption
techniques specific for pub/sub allows encrypting publication headers and subscription
constraints while preserving the ability to do content-based routing. These encryption
mechanisms and the corresponding matching operation, which we denote as encrypted
matching, allow preserving the functional model for publications and subscriptions parts
that are defined as both routable and sensitive in a given domain.
2.5. The two lines of research on pub/sub confidentiality
Published work on pub/sub confidentiality can be classified in two principal categories:
research focused on leveraging existing security models and techniques, and research focused
on providing pub/sub specific forms of encryption. While these two lines of research are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, most of the existing work falls into one of the two categories,
which makes the classification natural.
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Research focused on security models. The first research avenue is geared towards finding
optimal architectures and security models for pub/sub infrastructures that must respond
to confidentiality threats. The cryptography mechanisms used are “conventional”: sensitive
fields in messages must be encrypted before entering untrusted domains. This encryption
is opaque, and no operation can be performed on the encrypted fields. In particular, it is
not possible to have fields that are both sensitive and routable, as no matching decision
can be made using their encrypted form. The threat models are generally detailed and
relatively complex: different trust assumptions can be set for the different domains and
system components depending on the sensitivity of the different pub/sub message parts,
allowing fine grain control. For instance, in our extended e-Health scenario detailed in
Section 2.3, differences in trust assumptions between different infrastructures, at the level of
individual fields in subscriptions, can be expressed and enforced. This is generally achieved
by deriving access control matrices in which pub/sub entities are the subjects, pub/sub
messages constitute the objects, and trust assumptions are formalized as access rights. We
review the literature on this topic in Section 3.
Research focused on encrypted matching. This second line of research focuses on devising
encryption techniques specific to pub/sub, and in the majority of cases content-based
pub/sub. These encryption techniques allow matching encrypted subscriptions against
encrypted publications, without requiring prior decryption and without revealing their
content. This is the only way to support fields that are both routable and sensitive for a
domain containing untrusted brokers. There is an important amount of work on devising
such encrypted matching schemes, which we survey in Section 4.
Each research direction suffers for a major drawback. Existing work on security models
precludes any routing on sensitive data in untrusted environments, which severely limits its
potential applications. Likewise, the body of work on encrypting matching often assumes
simplistic threat models: every broker is untrusted and all the fields in pub/sub messages
are sensitive when passing through the broker infrastructure. We advocate bridging these
two research avenues in our concluding notes in Section 5.
3. CONFIDENTIALITY IN PUB/SUB SECURITY MODELS
The first line of research covered in our survey focuses on security models for pub/sub
infrastructures. The solutions we overview in this section generally consider security models
based on access control. Different trust assumptions apply to the various domains to which
the publishers, subscribers or brokers belong. Pub/sub data confidentiality must still be
preserved, but the granularity of what data must be protected depends on the security model
definition. For instance, some of the brokers might be allowed to access part of the content
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of publications and subscriptions when they are granted the required authorization. An
illustration is the routing infrastructure used by the police services in our e-Health scenario
described in Section 2.3. The police brokers are allowed to access in cleartext and route
against only a subset of the attributes in a publication’s headers, but not allowed to access
other attributes in the same headers.
All solutions reviewed in this section target the content-based pub/sub paradigm. They
are actually generally oblivious to the nature of the matching operation that is performed, as
their primary goal is to ensure that only authorized entities get access to the fields used for
routing in the clear, after which they can perform an arbitrary type of matching operation.
This matching operation could be, without loss of generality, a single equality on a single
attribute matching the topic-based model.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. We first review generic broker-based
pub/sub systems in Subsection 3.1, followed by solutions used in ubiquitous computing in
Subsection 3.2. We conclude the section by discussing the limitations of the existing security
models in Subsection 3.3.
3.1. Generic broker-based pub/sub systems
The work we overview in this subsection does not focus on the development of cryptographic
mechanisms themselves but leverages existing general-purpose encryption schemes. The
solutions reviewed in this section and their main properties are summarized in Figure 4.
[Bacon et al. 2008] describes a pub/sub security solution that uses a role-based access
control model (RBAC). The initial form of this architecture is described in [Belokosztolszki
et al. 2003] and extended in [Bacon et al. 2005; Pesonen and Bacon 2005; Pesonen et al.
2007a; Pesonen et al. 2007b]. It builds upon OASIS [Bacon et al. 2002], an RBAC solution
for distributed systems, and integrates the Hermes pub/sub platform [Pietzuch and Bacon
2002]. Confidentiality is addressed in particular in [Bacon et al. 2008]. Additional work on
security aspects in pub/sub systems that relate to confidentiality is detailed in [Bacon et al.
2010] for multi-domain systems and in [Singh et al. 2011] for disclosure control.
Architecture. [Bacon et al. 2008] considers that the participants to the pub/sub system
(publishers, subscribers, brokers) span multiple administrative domains. One domain is
designated as the coordinating domain, and its role is to invite other domains to join the
pub/sub system. Each domain includes an access control manager responsible for enforcing
rights for pub/sub operations for its own nodes. Key group managers are in charge of
administrating key groups for rights related to cryptographic operations. This operation is
distinct from that of the access control managers.
Functionality. The functionality model is based on role based access control (RBAC).
Pub/sub system clients can be granted the right to define message types (e.g., the right to
register a “patient data” publication type). Clients become the owners of the message types
they register and can define the associated access control policies. A policy associates the
actions each role is allowed to perform for the message type. A role can be associated with
the right to advertise a message before its publication, to publish and/or subscribe, but also
to modify existing types or define new ones. The enforcement of type policies is delegated to
the access control managers in the administrative domains.
Cryptography is used to provide fine-grained access control and thus confidentiality
enforcement in the system. The initial encryptions and final decryptions of pub/sub messages
before their deliveries are carried out by edge brokers (i.e., the brokers that are directly
connected to the publishers and subscribers). An underlying assumption is that edge brokers
are trusted to access the pub/sub data from the clients that belong to their own domain and
thus connect to them. Besides this assumption, access rights for non-edge brokers are set in
the policies defined by type owners. Similar to the functionality of access control managers,
key group managers enforce the policies that authorize brokers to join key groups. A key
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group consists of brokers that share the same level of access to the keys required to encrypt
or decrypt pub/sub data. [Pesonen et al. 2007a] and [Bacon et al. 2008] suggest using OFT
(One-way Function Trees) [Sherman and McGrew 2003] for key management in the groups
that are formed. [Pesonen et al. 2007b] mentions AES [Daemen and Rijmen 2002] in EAX
mode [Bellare et al. 2003] as the preferred encryption scheme.
Enforcing confidentiality. The level of protection for pub/sub data depends on the encryp-
tion granularity. Two cases are considered: encryption of the whole message and encryption
per attribute. The first case allows any broker to route messages based on their type, which
is always accessible. This is similar to topic-based routing. Authorized brokers can decrypt
complete messages and perform content based routing. When encryption per attribute is
used, an independent encryption key is associated to each of the attributes. The routing
capacity of each broker depends on the attributes it can decrypt according to its given
rights: if a broker can (cannot) decrypt an attribute, then it can (cannot) route based on the
content of this attribute. This allows to model fine-grained trust assumptions by the type
owners but also implies a level of overhead for key management that grows proportionally
with the number of accessible attributes.
[Zhao and Sturman 2006] presents a service model for providing access control in a
pub/sub system. This work focuses on the ability to change the access rules at runtime. The
ideas are implemented in the Gryphon [Strom et al. 1998] pub/sub system.
Architecture. Access to pub/sub data going through multiple administrative domains is
regulated through access control and a versioning control is used for changing the access
control policies. A security administrator entity has the responsibility of adding or performing
changes to the rights granted to the pub/sub system clients. Subscribers and publishers are
not trusted to perform actions on pub/sub data unless specifically authorized.
Functionality. Pub/sub clients obtain rights for certain actions such as connect, publish or
subscribe if they authenticate successfully as a principal. This is similar to a role: multiple
clients can run on behalf of the same principal. The service model formalizes access control
rules into rights using an extended format for pub/sub messages: [Principal, Type of Access,
Filter ]. The type of access can represent simple actions (e.g., connecting to the system) or
complex actions (e.g., registering a subscription). The access right is given by the filter,
which for simple actions can be a boolean value (e.g., granting or not the connection right)
and for complex actions an extended filter (e.g., setting restrictions for allowed subscription
or publication types). The rights are stored in a database by the security administrator,
which also handles rights changes (the version control). Such changes are processed in atomic
batches distributed across the broker network. The brokers synchronize with the security
administrator on the starting point, in the message data stream, where the new rights apply.
This synchronization guarantees the consistency of the access control rules throughout the
whole system.
Enforcing confidentiality. Confidentiality for publications is achieved by limiting their
distribution to subscribers through subscriptions rights. Also, the authors mention that
brokers with different levels of trust should be partitioned into different domains, regulating
communication through access control policies.
[Khurana 2005] presents a security model relying on proxy re-encryption, targeting a
pub/sub system for secure XML document dissemination [Bertino and Ferrari 2002]. The
scheme is based on [Jakobsson 1999].
Architecture. The threat model assumes that brokers are not trusted to access sensitive
parts of pub/sub messages, and routing is only performed using non-sensitive fields. The
system requires the presence of trusted servers that host a proxy security and accounting
service (PSAS).
Functionality. Only the sensitive and non-routable parts of publications are encrypted.
Dissemination of the publications relies on secure XML document distribution [Bertino and
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Ferrari 2002], which itself relies on symmetric encryption. A publication encryption key is
further encrypted with a public key belonging to the publisher and sent along with the
encrypted publication. PSAS servers are in charge of distributing the symmetric publication
encryption key. The PSAS also acts upon broker requests by transforming the messages
encrypted with the public key of a publisher into messages encrypted with the public keys of
the subscribers. This avoids a direct exchange of keys between the source and destinations,
but requires that a quorum of PSAS servers be constantly available to ensure service
availability. Consequently, these PSAS servers constitute single points of failure and may
impair the scalability of the solution.
Enforcing confidentiality. Confidentiality is considered only for publications, and solely
enforced for the non-routable attributes. The authors do not specifically state how publication
payloads should be protected, but we assume that these can be encrypted using the key
used for encrypting non-routable attributes.
[Fiege et al. 2004] presents a security solution based on scopes, which allow defining
groups of entities with the same trust level and authorizations. The solution is implemented
in the Rebeca pub/sub system [Parzyjegla et al. 2010].
Architecture. Publishers, subscribers and brokers are joined in different groups named
scopes. The communication within a scope is isolated. The admission of new members to a
scope requires credential authentication according to the scope acceptance criteria.
Functionality. The definition of scopes depends on common trust relationships established
between different administrative domains. A scope can recursively be a member of other
scopes. Scopes are used to limit the visibility of messages to their members through the use
of access control policies. The enforcement of these policies is based on checks performed on
attribute certificates [Farrell and Housley 2002]. These represent credentials consisting of a
signed identity associated to a set of attributes that belong to the entities in the system.
Attribute certificates are issued either by an attribute authority or by the owner of the
broker network that belongs to a certain scope.
Nodes obtain credentials and use them when advertising a type of publication (the
functional model requires this step before publishing) or when they try to submit subscriptions.
Edge brokers check credentials and may allow the dissemination inside the scope. A broker
tries to match the attributes in a subscriber’s certificate to the ones in the publisher’s
advertisements that was previously received. If this check fails, the subscriptions will not be
processed.
Enforcing confidentiality. The confidentiality property is not specifically addressed in the
paper. However, the access control mechanisms provide confidentiality against any node that
falls outside a scope of trust. This does not modify the content of messages for protection,
but merely restricts their dissemination.
[Wun and Jacobsen 2007] presents a policy management framework offering general
services for pub/sub architectures. It goes beyond security enforcement, which is nonetheless
presented as the main use case. The framework was implemented on top of the PADRES [Ja-
cobsen et al. 2010] pub/sub system.
Architecture and functionality. The design is centered on a post-matching policy model.
A policy contains condition-based rules that define actions to execute when the rules are
triggered. Rules can be triggered while or immediately after matching the publications with
the subscriptions. The main purpose is to avoid testing the rules a priori, which would
duplicate the matching functionality when using policy rules that are semantically based on
the publication content.
The article considers a simple setting of trust groups. The entities forming the trust groups
(publisher, subscriber, broker) interact as discussed next. For security enforcement, the au-
thors assume as a precondition that each trust group is associated with a shared group secret.
This secret information is used by pub/sub entities for authentication and encryption using
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specific group related protocols. The policy management framework preserves confidentiality
using authenticated event scopes and security zones.
Enforcing confidentiality. Authenticated event scopes are associations of an authentication
policy with rules in the post-matching model. For instance, if a message must be routed to a
certain broker after it was matched, an authentication of the receiver might first be performed
according to the policy. Security zones extend the functionality of authentication policies by
providing publication confidentiality at the granularity of attributes. The attributes in the
matched publications can be either pruned or encrypted before forwarding based on criteria
given by established zones with different policy settings.
3.2. Pub/sub privacy for ubiquitous computing
The pub/sub dissemination model can be applied to sensor networks used in ubiquitous
computing. Using our e-Health example from Section 2.3, consider an array of sensors for
home patients monitoring temperature, heart rate, etc. These sensors periodically report
measurements on which the system can react by notifying a physician based on registered
subscriptions (e.g., temperature > 37.5).
Due to power and computational constraints in mobile environments, the existing work
does not consider complex confidentiality preserving schemes. The approach is limited to
simple access control mechanisms, which is conceptually close to the work surveyed in this
section. We briefly present in the following two relevant examples, that both target the
content-based model.
[Opyrchal et al. 2006] proposes an access control policy model sharing similarities with [Be-
lokosztolszki et al. 2003] and [Bacon et al. 2008]. An application consists of multiple event
types, and the administrator of an application is an entity who can grant the right to perform
actions within the application, including adding new event types and delegating ownership
of events. An event owner is an entity who has the right to authorize actions over an event
type, including publishing, subscribing, receiving and changing the policy of an event. These
rights can be further delegated to other licensed entities. The brokers enforce the access
control and can restrict the registration of subscriptions or the delivery of publications
according to the policy settings, including dynamic conditions (e.g., limiting the number of
events delivered to a subscriber).
The test case is a location tracking application: users carry RFID badges, and sensors
detecting their location report the data to location publishers who then send the data to
the brokers. The architecture is thus similar to a generic enterprise broker-based pub/sub
system.
[Tian et al. 2013] considers a centralized pub/sub system formed of a privacy engine,
a subscription manager, and a matching engine having the role of a broker. Sensor data
is captured by device agents and transmitted to the pub/sub system. The privacy engine
attaches privacy points to the subscriptions constraints and publication attributes. For
instance, in our e-Health monitoring example, a subscription could be {temperature < 37, 5,
t < 5}, where t is a privacy threshold. A temperature measurement reported to the system
can have a privacy point based, for instance, on its location, like {temperature = 38, t = 4}
if the patient is in the kitchen or {temperature = 38, t = 6} if the patient is in the bedroom.
Functions for privacy points can make the system more flexible: event delivery could be
allowed when the patient temperature reaches a critical point but denied otherwise. We
remark again that the access control design is orthogonal to the sensor network itself and
thus similar to a generic enterprise broker-based pub/sub system.
3.3. Limitations of surveyed security models
Despite allowing fine-grain trust relations and control over the sensitivity of fields in pub/sub
messages, the work surveyed in this section has a major limitation: it does not allow brokers
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in untrusted domains to route publications using sensitive fields in said domains. In our
e-Health example of Figure 2, the e-Health broker infrastructure hosted in a public cloud
would not be able to filter patients information flowing from Hospital A to Hospital B or the
police infrastructure. It could only forward all messages sent between these three domains.
The system will ultimately have to rely on one of the two following solutions: either all
messages have to be flooded and filtered in the destination domain, where the required
routable fields are non-sensitive, or all subscriptions must be replicated from the subscriber
domains to all the publishers domains in order to filter messages at the source. These bypass
solutions imply either a waste of bandwidth and a poor scalability, or increased management
complexity, loss of the decoupling between producers and consumers of information, and
storage overhead.
As a direct consequence, the brokers’ inability to perform computations over sensitive
fields, precludes also the possibility to perform additional optimizations at the broker level,
such as leveraging subscription containment. Although determining subscription containment
can be seen as a confidentiality liability in some cases [Barazzutti et al. 2012; Barazzutti
et al. 2015; Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006], depending on the level of security desired in the
pub/sub application domain, it can also consist in a viable tool for improving performance.
These fundamental limitations greatly decrease the appeal of using public cloud infras-
tructures to host pub/sub routing services, despite its numerous advantages like availability,
cost-effectiveness and elasticity [Barazzutti et al. 2014]. This limitation led to the develop-
ment of a new class of encrypted matching schemes, allowing routing over sensitive fields.
We review the existing encrypted matching schemes in the next section.
4. CONFIDENTIALITY THROUGH ENCRYPTED MATCHING
In this section, we survey the existing work on encrypted matching, a form of encryption
that allows routing based on the content of sensitive, thus encrypted data. We first start by
describing the general characteristics of encrypted matching schemes in Section 4.1, followed
by the presentation of the schemes themselves in Section 4.2.
4.1. General properties of encrypted matching schemes
Encrypted matching schemes are used in pub/sub systems to encrypt subscriptions and
publication headers. We define the functional requirement of encrypted matching algorithms
as solely the ability to perform the matching operation between a subscription and a
publication, where at least one of the two messages is encrypted.2 The algorithms do not
need to decrypt as long as this matching operation is possible. The flow of subscriptions
ends at one of the brokers, where they are stored in their encrypted form, whereas the flow
of publications ends at the subscribers, who are usually interested in the publication payload
(if the header information is also of interest, it can be added in the payload).
We split the matching schemes based on the algorithm class they fit into: private-key cryp-
tography and public-key cryptography. In private-key cryptography (also known as symmetric-
key), the same private key information is used for both encryption and decryption, whereas
in public-key cryptography (asymmetric) a public key is used for encryption and a differ-
ent private key is used for decryption. We are aware that this classification is somewhat
misleading due to the lack of decryption, but it remains the most natural in this context.
While there was no published work providing a finer classification and formal model for
encrypted matching classification, we suggest and argue in Section 5.4 that functional
encryption [Boneh et al. 2011] would be a good starting point for defining such a model, a
work that is however beyond the scope of the survey aspect of the current paper.
2The majority of the schemes encrypt both publications and subscriptions, but this relaxed definition allows
us to include exceptions.
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4.1.1. Matching algorithms. Published work can be classified in two categories based on the
encrypted matching operation:
Matching based on an exact relation preserving isomorphism. Consider a function 3
applied on a publication attribute a and a constraint value c such that a matching relation
between a and c can be determined. For instance, the difference 3(a, c) = a−c can determine
a “greater than” relation and whether or not the attribute matches the constraint. Consider
now the encryption algorithm E and a function 2 applied on the ciphertexts E(a) and E(c).
If an isomorphism
3(a, c) = 2(E(a), E(c)) (1)
can be established, then based on the result of 2 we can determine the matching between a
and c. A typical example is the asymmetric scalar product-preserving encryption scheme
(ASPE) [Choi et al. 2010].
Matching schemes based on isomorphisms include schemes based on homomorphic en-
cryption. Such schemes have the property that given two plaintext terms a and c and two
operations 3 and 2, we have
E(3(a, c)) = 2(E(a), E(c)). (2)
The difference between (1) and (2) is that in (2) the function 3 is encrypted. Providing 3 to
a broker is thus insufficient to determine the relationship between a and c without decrypting,
however an untrusted broker cannot be allowed to decrypt messages. To overcome this issue,
classic homomorphic schemes must be adapted for encrypted matching scenarios, as done
in [Nabeel et al. 2009; Nabeel et al. 2012].
Matching based on a pre-mapped equality comparison. The publication attributes and
subscription constraints are pre-mapped to sets of values that permit matching strictly based
on equality comparisons. An encryption scheme E is then applied to the pre-mapped results
so that the equality can still be evaluated over the resulting ciphertexts. The pre-mapping
operation varies. In some cases, approximations are used to handle inequality constraints.
Other instances consider the bit prefixes of constraint c and attribute a; if a prefix in the
set associated to a is equal to a prefix from the set associated to c, then the matching is
positive.
Matching schemes using pre-mapped equality comparisons include schemes that rely on
attribute-based encryption (ABE), although in most cases is used for access control and
not for encrypted matching. In some cases (e.g., [Tariq et al. 2014]), the scheme design
does not require or consider preserving both subscription and publication confidentiality,
and the ABE decryption also serves implicitly for encrypted matching. Generally, an extra
encryption layer must be added besides ABE to hide the attributes (publication headers)
and the access structure (subscription constraints), and to perform encrypted matching over
these. Pre-mapping to bit prefixes in conjunction with ABE was used in [Ion et al. 2012; Ion
et al. 2010b].
It can be argued that matching based on a pre-mapped equality comparison is a special
case of matching based on a relation preserving isomorphism. However, it is natural to
distinguish both approaches since there are cryptographic schemes supporting only equality
comparisons with a preliminary mapping phase.
4.1.2. Types of constraints handled. The constraints of a subscription can be classified based
on two criteria:
• type of field - numerical or string;
• type of operator - equality or range for numerical types, and identity, prefix, suffix and
substring for strings.
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In our description of the encrypted matching algorithms, we pay special attention to schemes
that allow inequality matching since they provide the most subscription expressiveness and
thus are the most interesting for content-based routing. Conversely, a scheme supporting
only equality operators and a single dimension falls into the simpler topic-based model.
4.1.3. Matching performance. Encrypted matching schemes evaluate a function over an
encrypted constraint and an encrypted publication attribute. Existing schemes however
differ greatly in terms of the supported constraints and matching technique, and comparing
the performance of the various solutions is cumbersome. It is nevertheless possible to
determine when the encrypted matching between a single constraint and an attribute requires
computations over a larger set of values (e.g., the complete set of publication attributes). This
can add a significant computation load, which makes these schemes unusable for workloads
with numerous attributes per publication. We point out such cases in our overview.
4.1.4. Cryptanalytic attack models. A cryptographic scheme has to withstand a range of
cryptanalysis attacks whose purpose is to obtain the plaintext or the encryption key. There
are four basic attack models considered when evaluating the security of classic cryptographic
schemes. They are based on the power of the attacker:
•Ciphertext-only attack (COA) when the attacker can only observe the ciphertexts;
•Known-plaintext attack (KPA) when the attacker can observe the exact correspondence
between ciphertexts and plaintexts;
•Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) when the attacker has the power to obtain the ciphertexts
corresponding to plaintexts of its choice;
•Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) when the attacker has the power to obtain the decryption
of ciphertexts of its choice.
Security analyses of CPAs or CCAs are usually formalized as an indistinguishability
game, where the attacker must distinguish ciphertexts with a non-negligible probability.
Unfortunately, due to the need to perform the matching operation, encrypted matching for
pub/sub is different from typical encrypted communication. We therefore concur with the
conclusions in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006] that the level of indistinguishability that is
achievable is limited in this setting. By matching encrypted publications against encrypted
subscriptions, an untrusted broker can infer similarities between publications. This is even
more problematic for schemes that can leverage subscription containment, because the ability
to determine that all events matching a subscription sa will match a containing subscription
sb allows an attacker to infer similarities between the subscriptions themselves, raising the
effectiveness of the attacker. For this reason, the security analysis of existing encrypted
matching schemes does not usually rely on indistinguishability proofs and the chosen attack
models CPA and CCA are seldom considered. Instead, existing work either defers to the
weaker KPA or COA or defines other attack models. A common assumption for the behavior
of brokers is to consider them as honest-but-curious.
4.1.5. Key management. The main goals of key management are to:
• allow system components to obtain or negotiate in a secure manner the initial information
(keys or other parameters) necessary to establish a secure communication;
• allow key information to be refreshed at the different parties when necessary: when a
member is evicted from the system and is not trusted anymore, when a member joins the
system and is not trusted to decrypt previous communicated information, to counter brute
force attacks, etc.
All encrypted matching schemes we overview require a form of exchange or negotiation
of secret information between the participating system components, even for solutions
relying on public key algorithms. Pub/sub systems, and in particular encrypted matching
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schemes, introduce important challenges for key management. First, the pub/sub decoupled
communication model makes it cumbersome to identify subscribers and publishers who
might need common key information. Second, encrypted subscriptions stored by brokers
are invalidated by a key refresh; this can cause service disruption. None of the encrypted
matching schemes we overview proposes or references a key management alternative that
addresses both of these issues:
• In most cases, key management is simply considered an orthogonal problem decoupled
from the cryptographic mechanism, and is required from an external entity.
• For schemes relying on attribute-based encryption, key information is associated with the
content of the pub/sub messages rather than with particular system parties. This attempts
to reduce the coupling required by the key exchange.
•The pub/sub functional model is modified towards a less decoupled model, therefore
allowing more straightforward designs for key management.
Key management is an open and challenging issue for pub/sub systems, far from being
satisfactorily solved by current research. For this reason, challenges and directions towards
potential solutions are discussed in details in Section 5.
4.2. Overview of encrypted matching solutions
In the following we overview existing pub/sub
Symbol Role
S subscription
P publication
A publication attributes
|A| number of attributes
C subscription constraints
|C| number of constraints
d number of dimensions
m bit size of values representation
E encryption algorithm
D decryption algorithm
EK encryption algorithm with key K
DK decryption algorithm with key K
Table I: Notations.
encrypted matching schemes. Many of these
schemes use complex mechanisms, sometimes par-
tially changed over different published versions of
the same scheme. We delve into particular mech-
anism details only when necessary for a better
understanding of the scheme. Therefore, we often
use a different, simplified notation compared to
the original articles. We write E(x) for a cipher-
text obtained using an encryption algorithm E
applied to the plaintext x, and D(y) for a decryp-
tion algorithm D applied to a ciphertext y. We
write EK(x) and DK(y) when using a particular
key K. The additional notation we use in this section is summarized in Table I.
Figure 5 summarizes the characteristics of the most representative solutions surveyed
based on the characteristics described in Section 4.1: type of encrypted matching, confiden-
tiality, containment support, and key management. Table II compares the representation
of publications and subscriptions before they are encrypted. This is relevant since it has
an important impact in practical implementations. For instance not all schemes permit
encryption of publications that do not include field values for all the dimensions. Table II
also specifies the estimated computational complexities for the message encryption and
encrypted matching operations.
Supported pub/sub paradigms. Most of the solutions surveyed in this section target the
content-based pub/sub paradigm. Their support for equality constraints (in some cases with
reduced complexity compared to more general types of constraints as seen in Table II)
make them suitable for a topic-based installation as well. Two exceptions are the schemes
presented in [Song et al. 2000] and [Crescenzo et al. 2013], that only support encrypted
matching for equality constraints. The principles of these two schemes are actually similar,
and the same principles are used as a basis for more complex schemes such as the one
in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006] (supporting the content-based model through a combination
of techniques for different types of constraints) or [Shikfa et al. 2009] (supporting only equality
constraints but on multiple attributes, hence classified in the content-based paradigm). The
EventGuard system [Srivatsa et al. 2011] also only supports equality matchings when
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Representation Complexity
Publication Subscription Enc. (Pub) Enc. (Sub) Match
[Choi et al. 2010]
→ constraints <,≥, >,≤,=
1 point in d dims. |C| points in d dims. O(d2) O(|C| · d2) O(|C| · d)
[Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006]
→ equality constraint =
|A| (dim., val.) pairs |C| (dim., val.) pairs O(|A|) O(|C|) O(|C|)
→ conjunctive set membership and <,≥, >,≤
bit field dictionary of size D O(D) O(|S|) O(|S|)
[Ion et al. 2010a; Ion et al. 2010b; Ion et al. 2012]
→ equality constraint =
|A| (dim., val.) pairs |C| (dim., val.) pairs O(|A|) O(|C|) O(|C|)
→ constraints <,≥, >,≤,=
|A| ·m tokens, each with 1
bit set
|C| ·O(m) tokens, each with
1 bit set
O(|A| ·m) O(|C| ·m) O(|C| ·m2)
[Nabeel et al. 2009; Nabeel et al. 2012; Nabeel et al. 2013]
→ constraints <,≥, >,≤,=
|A| (dim., val.) pairs |C| (dim., val.) pairs O(|A| · logn) O(|C| · logn) O(|C|)
[Li et al. 2004]
→ constraints <,≥, >,≤,=
|A| (dim., val.) pairs |C| (dim., I) pairs O(|A| ·m2) O(|C| ·m3) O(|C| ·m)
[Tariq et al. 2010; Tariq et al. 2014]
→ constraints <,≥, >,≤,=
all L domain
decompositions containing
pub. point
smallest domain
decomposition containing
sub. range(s)
O(L)
(does not
apply)
O(d)
Table II: Computational complexity and pre-encryption data representation of encrypted matching
schemes. For [Choi et al. 2010], we have |A| = d as all attributes must have a value
in a publication. For [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006], |S| is the number of items in the
subscription set to be tested for inclusion in the publications’ sets. For [Nabeel et al. 2009]
n is the upper limit of the Paillier cryptosystem plaintext domain. For [Li et al. 2004] I is
the set of prefixes covering the range of a constraint and whose size is O(m).
Based on exact relation 
preserving isomorphism
Based on pre-mapped 
equality comparison
Encrypted matching Containment Key managementConfidentiality
Publications and subscriptions 
are confidential
Subscriptions are 
not confidential 
Containment determination
is not supported
[Choi et al. 2010]
[Nabeel et al. 2009]
[Ion et al. 2012]
[Li et al. 2004]
[Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006]
[Tariq et al. 2014]
[Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006]
[Tariq et al. 2014]
[All other schemes] [All other schemes]
Containment determination
is supported
[Ion et al. 2012]
Coupled peers
[Nabeel et al. 2009]
External solution or 
central trusted authority
[All other schemes]
Fig. 5: Overview of representative encrypted matching solutions.
protecting publication and subscription confidentiality using encrypted matching, but the
main focus of this system is on the protection of payload confidentiality. Protecting payload
confidentiality only obviously allows using an arbitrary filtering model using attributes and
constraints in the clear.
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[Choi et al. 2010] describes a solution using asymmetric scalar product-preserving encryp-
tion (ASPE). ASPE was initially introduced by [Wong et al. 2009] for secure kNN query
computation on encrypted databases. The solution applies to any numerical constraint.
S1 S S2 P
r r
Fig. 6: The ASPE subscription split.
Scheme mechanism. Publication attributes and subscriptions constraints are represented as
coordinates of multidimensional points. The scheme relies on computations and comparisons
that use the Euclidean distance between points in the multidimensional space. The simple
1-dimension case is shown in Figure 6. Consider a subscription point S and a publication
point P that must be matched. Without loss of generality, suppose that we want to find
whether S < P .3 The subscriber chooses two reference subscription points S1 and S2
located symmetrically at equal but random distance r from S. The distance difference
D1 = d(S1, P )− d(S2, P ) can then be compared to zero to determine the relation between
S and P :
d(S1, P )− d(S2, P ) > 0⇔ d(S1, P ) > d(S2, P )⇔ S < P.
The distance difference D1 can be expressed as a sum of scalar products:
D1 = d(S1, P )− d(S2, P ) =‖ S1 ‖2 − ‖ S2 ‖2 +2(S2 − S1) · P.
The core principle of ASPE is to allow the encryption of points S1, S2 and P while
preserving the ability to compute the scalar product. This allows the algorithm to determine
the distance difference D1 but does not preserve the actual distance between S and P . The
motivation behind this strategy is that [Wong et al. 2009] proves that any encryption scheme
preserving the distance between two points is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks (KPA).
The key on the subscriber side is an invertible matrix M , whereas on the publisher side the
key is M−1. The matching phase relies on the key reduction when the ciphertext encrypted
with M is multiplied with the one encrypted with M−1. The result obtained is D2 = D1q,
i.e., the distance difference D1 multiplied by a positive random scalar q. The scheme is thus
based on an exact relation preserving isomorphism, as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Subscription
containment can be supported by adding extra reference points to the subscription.
Security considerations. The security evaluation in [Choi et al. 2010] is rather shallow and
only considers a particular ciphertext-only attack (COA). To guarantee subscription and
publication confidentiality, the authors rely on the more comprehensive security proofs given
in the original database scenario [Wong et al. 2009]. However, to strengthen the security,
[Wong et al. 2009] enhance the original scheme by splitting the original dimensions and
introducing additional artificial dimensions. These additions are not discussed in [Choi et al.
2010], but they appear to be adaptable to the pub/sub case.
Practical aspects. ASPE is a private-key algorithm, which requires that the key information
be distributed among participants. However, the paper does not give any information about
key management. Another limitation is the multidimensional case (multiple constraints and
attributes) that is also only briefly discussed. Our own analysis on this indicates that the
encrypted matching depends on the size d of the schema defining the set of publication
attributes, the complexity being O(d) per evaluated constraint. This yields a quadratic
complexity for matching one subscription if the number of constraints is close to the number
3The cases S ≤ P , S > P , S ≥ P and S = P are done similarly.
Author’s Version - c©ACM, 2016
20 Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
Publisher Untrusted Broker Subscriber
encrypted matching:
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
36 · Onica, Felber, Mercier & Rivie`re
6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Fig. 7: Encrypted matching for equalities in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006].
of dimensions. Therefore, the solution is less appropriate for workloads that require a large
number of attributes.
We can consider as a practical use case the stock quote notification system referenced
in Section 1.2. The set of dimensions for the published data in such a scenario is not very
large: a symbol name and various fields related to the quote value and variation. Although
ASPE supports only numerical constraints, it can accommodate string fields like symbol
name or stock market indicator by simply mapping their values to a numerical domain.
This is possible when the operation used on such fields is limited to equality comparisons.
ASPE supports ranged evaluation over encrypted data, which can be particularly useful in
pub/sub workload such as the monitoring of gain or loss trends in stock quote variations.
This scenario involves periods of high throughput publications and a large number of active
subscriptions depending on the stock market activity, which are well suited for optimizations
based on the containment support of ASPE. However, these optimizations decrease the
confidentiality of the scheme [Barazzutti et al. 2015].
[Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006] presents a set of encrypted matching mechanisms that
use different encryption techniques according to the type of values (integer or string) and
the nature of subscriptions constraints (equality or range).
Scheme mechanism. For equality filtering, the paper uses a simple scheme initially proposed
by [Song et al. 2000] and used in [Shikfa et al. 2009; Srivatsa and Liu 2007]. The mechanism is
depicted in Figure 7. Subscribers and publishers share a common secret K. A parameterized
pseudorandom function Fk is applied to the publication attribute a at the publisher, and
to the constraint c at the subscriber. While key c = FK(c) is sent directly to the broker,
key a = FK(a) is used as the parame er for another application of F , this time to a random
token R. This yields the encrypted publication encpub. R and encpub are sent to the broker,
who is able to compute Fkey c(R). If this is equal to encpub (denoted by the
?
= sign) then
the equality constraint matches. In summary, the scheme idea is using the ciphertexts of the
attributes and the constraints as keys, while the actual encrypted plaintext compared in the
matching phase is random. If the keys are equal then the matching is positive.
This simple scheme is extended to conjunctive set membership. The application proposed
by the authors is to check for the presence of a set of keywords in the subscription in a
set of keywords representing the publication. The mechanism can be applied to any set
membership problem where the definition domain of the set is known and of small size, and
can be easily modified to support disjunctive set membership. We present an example of
this extension in the following.
The algorithm considers a dictionary of size D that indexes the D possible values in the
domain, and a randomly chosen secret key K formed of two halves {K1,K2}. Both are
available to all publishers and subscribers. Since the dictionary must index all elements
from the set’s domain, this domain must be of bounded and known size—this size must also
remain reasonably small as the space complexity of encrypted publications is in O(D).
Figure 8 illustrates the matching of a subscription S with conjunctive constraints for items
Y and Z against a publication P including only the item Y .
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the publication from the ones
who are not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching between the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
1
d
 X
 Y
⇤X
⇤Y
key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X)
key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y )
Etienne Istopped rewriting hereJ
Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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Encrypted matching techniques f r other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dic io ary. For nstance, for nu erical inequalities, a set
of ref rence points are cho e as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick he closest reference point in the di tionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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by defining n appr priate dic ionary. For insta , for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference p ints are chosen as th dict onary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximat on of the values i required before encryption
to pick the closest ref r nce point i the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the publication from the ones
who are not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching between the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
1
d
 X
 Y
⇤X
⇤Y
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key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y )
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
a d S = { X}. T e fir t st p of th encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On he subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publi ation side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all in ex positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dic ionary (not only the ones present in the
publication . This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G appli d to a random value R. This results in a vector
of ncrypted dicti nary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the publication from the ones
wh re not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’ (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the br ker. On the broker, the matching between the
e cryp ed subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is p rformed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If ll constraints of the subscription are
matched, he publication matches he subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where ny of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryptio
to pick the clos st eference poi t in th dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is d termined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vect r with approximation points for each constraint.
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in per uted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the publication from the ones
who are not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching between the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
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P and S can be modelle as sets of   indexes in e dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step f the encryp ion for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared k yed pseudorandom
permutation funct on EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses in exes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
c strai t c in he equali y matching scheme.
O the subscript o side, F is us d with param ter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) d k y ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publicati n side, the operati n i in two eps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), at are used as keys for anoth r
pseu orandom function G applied t a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵ entiate the ind xes of attribut s pr sent in the publication from the ones
who ar not, values gi corresponding to the permu ed i dexes ⇤ p li ation
are XOR’d (operation  ) with v lue 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the rando value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching between the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) nd the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to th equality mat hing scheme, but applying the
  peration instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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Encrypted atching chni ues for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defini g an appr pria e dictionary. F r instance, for numerical equalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this c se, initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference poi t in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the publication from the ones
who are not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching between the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publicat on and the
subscription i to permute these   indexes using a first shar d keyed pseudorando
permutation function EK1 This results n permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscription side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resul ing in k y ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) a d key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On th
publication side, the operation is i two ste s. First, the scheme applies FK2 t
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
public tion). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom func i G applied to a random value R. This results in a vec or
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵ entiate th indexes of attrib tes present in the publication from the ones
who are not, valu s gi corres ond ng t the permuted indexes of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vec or J is sent along with
the random value R o th br ker. On the broker, the matching b tween th
encryp ed subscr ption (⇤X , k y ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permute these   indexes usi g a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c in the equality matching scheme.
On the subscri tion side, F is used with parameter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). O the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] i the dictionary (not only the ones present in the
publication). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. This results in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the indexes of attributes present in the ublication from the ones
who are not, values gi corresponding to the permuted indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching b tween the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality matching scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscription are
matched, the publication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be present in order
to match is trivial to implement at the broker level, constraints being evaluated
individually).
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes in the dictionary, .e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step of the encryption for both the publication and th
subscription is to permute these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutatio function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses indexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constraint c n he equality matching scheme.
On the s bscription side, F is sed with para eter K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ indexes, resulti g in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operati is in two steps. First, the scheme appli FK2 to
all index positions i 2 [1 . . . d] in the dictionary (not only the o es present in the
publicati n). This yields d values ri = FK2(i), that are used as keys for another
pseudorandom function G applied to a random valu R. This results in a v ctor
of encrypt d dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order
to di↵erentiate the index s of attributes p esent in the publication from the ones
who are ot, values gi corresponding to the permut d indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XOR’d (operation  ) with v lue 1. The resu ting vector J is sent along with
the random value R to the broker. On the broker, the matching betwee the
encrypted subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performed similarly to the equality mat h ng scheme, but applying the
  operation instead of a direct equality comparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyword X appears in the publication. If all constraints of the subscriptio are
matched, the p blication matches the subscription (we note here that a disjunctive
scheme where any of the keywords in S should be in P should be pres nt in order
to match is trivial to imple ent at the broker level, constraints eing evaluated
individually).
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P and S can be modelled as sets of   indexes the dic ionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first st p of the encrypti n for both the publicatio and the
subs ription is to permut these   indexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
permutation function EK1 . Thi r ults in permuted ind xes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Th ses ind xes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
constrain c n the quality matchi g cheme.
On the ubscr ption side, F is used with param ter K2 to ncrypt th wo
⇤ indexes, resulting in key X = FK2(⇤X) nd key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
publication side, the operation is in two steps. First, th scheme applie FK2 to
all ind x posi ions 2 [1 . . . d] in the d ctionary (not only the ones pr se t in the
publicat on). This yields values ri = FK2(i), tha are used as keys for ano r
pseudorandom function G applied to a random value R. Thi re ults in a vector
of encrypted dictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in rder
to di↵ rent at the indexes of attributes prese t in the publication from the ones
who are no , val e gi corr sponding to the permute indexes ⇤ of the publication
are XO ’d (operation  ) with value 1. The resulting vector J is sent along with
th random valu R to the roker. O the broker, the matching b tw en the
encrypted ubscri tion (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) and he encry ted publica
(J,R) is p rformed similarly to he equality matchi g schem , but applying the
  peration ins ad of a dir ct equality c mparison. If J⇤X   Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1,
keyw rd X appears in he publication. If all constrai ts of the ubs ription re
matched, the publication matches the ubscription (w note here that a disjunctive
scheme wh re any of th keywords in S should be in P should b prese t in order
to match is trivial to implement at the brok level, constraints being evaluated
in ividually).
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P and S c n be modelle as sets of   ndexes in the dictionary, i.e., P = { X , Y }
and S = { X}. The first step f the encryption for both the publication and the
subscription is to permut these   i dexes using a first shared keyed pseudorandom
p rmutation function EK1 . This results in permuted indexes ⇤ 2 [1 . . . d], e.g.,
⇤X = EK1( X). Theses i dexes ⇤ are used similarly to the attributes a and
cons raint c in the equality matc ing scheme.
On the subscriptio sid , F s us with paramet r K2 to encrypt the two
⇤ i dexes, r ulting in key ⇤X = FK2(⇤X) and key ⇤Y = FK2(⇤Y ). On the
public ion side, the op ra ion is in wo steps. First, the scheme applies FK2 to
all index positio s i 2 [1 . . . d] i th dictio a (not only he ones present in the
publication). Thi yields values ri = 2 i), that are used as keys for another
seud ra dom func ion G applied to a random valu R. This results in a vector
of e c pted ictionary indexes gi, i 2 [1 . . . d] wh e gi = Gr (R). Finally, in order
to i↵erentiate the ind xes of t ributes pr ent in the publication from the ones
who are not, values i corr s onding to t p rmuted indexes ⇤ f the publication
a e XOR’d (operation  ) ith va ue 1. The result g vector J is sent along with
th random value R to the broker. On the broker, th matc ing between the
encry te subscription (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ) an the encrypted publication
(J,R) is performe simil ly to the quality matching sc eme, but applying the
  operation ins ead of a di ect equali y comparison. If J⇤X   Gk y ⇤X (R) = 1,
keywor X appears n the publicatio . If all con trai ts of the subscription are
m tched, publication matches t subscriptio (we not here that a disjunctive
schem where an of the keywords S l i P should be present in order
to match is trivial o imp em n t he broker level, constrain s being evaluated
i dividually).
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the val es is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent distin-
guishability (although containment support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscription encryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on private-
key encryption. This requires prior key exchange between participants, although
there is no solution proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints generates false positives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for performance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a bit vector with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
be decrypted only if an access policy associated with the subscriber that receives
them is satisfied. The access policy sets a specific structure for the subscription
constraints and dictates the format of publications’ attributes. Constraints are
encoded into an access tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes re built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the val es is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent distin-
guishability (although containment support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscription encryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on private-
key encryption. This requires prior key exchange between participants, although
there is no solution proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints generates false positives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for performance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a bit vector with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
be decrypted only if an access policy associated with the subscriber that receives
them is satisfied. The access policy sets a specific structure for the subscription
constraints and dictates the format of publications’ attributes. Constraints are
encoded into an access tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying
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Encrypted matching techniques for the types f constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For nstance, for num rical inequalities, a set
of reference points are ch sen as the dictionary ( .g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial app oximation of the val es is requir d before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison esig as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent distin-
guishability (although containment support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscription encryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on private-
key encryption. This requires prior key exchange between participants, although
there is no solution proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints generates false positives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for performance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted essages.
If containment support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a bit vector with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
be decrypted only if a access policy associated with the subscriber that receives
them is satisfied. The access policy sets a specific structure for the subscription
constraints and dictates the format of publications’ attributes. Constraints are
encoded into an access tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying
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Enc ypt d m t h ng tec n que for other types f c nstraint /attributes are built
by defini g an ppropriate dictionary. For instance, f r numerical inequalities, a set
of refe nce poi ts are chosen as the ctionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this cas , an initi l approxima io of the val es is required before encryption
to pick th closest reference poi t in the dictio ary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-m pp d equality comparison design s defined in Section 4.1. Subscr ption
contai ent is determined in a similar manne . This implies adding an additional
fer nce vector with approximation points for each c n traint.
Security considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
in istinguish bility that can be obtaine with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine co tainment relations leads to inherent distin-
guishability (although contai ment support is opti al). The authors admit that in
su h a case, subscription encry tion is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. The p rticular attack model considered is focused on
the brok r’s ability to dis nguish between publicat ons, and the analysis shows that
th only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical spe ts. All schemes c in the paper are based on private-
key encryption. This requ res prior key exchange between participants, although
th re is no s lu on proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraint ge erates false positives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the di tio ary decr ases. Unfortunate y, a small dictionary is required
for perf rmance purpos s because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If conta nment sup ort is enabled, encrypted sub criptions must include for each
constraint a bit vector with the ize equal to the numbe of reference values in the
dictionary. The ncrypted publications i lude also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the containment t sts. This does not a↵ect
the matching of dividu subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker lev l.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi- ser searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mecha ism. We iscussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is d for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
be decrypted only if a access policy ass ciat d with the subscriber that receives
them i satisfied. The access p licy sets a specific structure for the subscription
constraints and dictates the form t f publications’ attributes. Constraints are
en oded into a ac ess tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying
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Encrypted matching te h iques for oth r ty es f constraints/at ributes a built
by defining an appro iate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a et
of ference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In thi case, a initial approximati n of th val es is required b fore encryption
to pick the cl sest poi t in e dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as d fined in Section 4.1. Subscription
co tainment is determined in a sim ar m nner. This mpli s adding an addition l
fer nce vector with ap roximation poin s for ach constraint.
Security considerations. The rticle points out the i herent lim tati n of the
i distinguishabil ty th t can be o tai d with encrypte matching scheme . For
instan e, the ability to de ermine co tai ment relations leads to inherent disti -
guishability (alth ug co tainment supp rt is ptio al). The au hors admit that in
such a case, ubscription ncryption is ot semantically secure and the fore focus
on publication confiden i li y. The particular ttack mo el consid d is focused on
the broker’s ability to disti guish b tween publications, nd the nalysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative ma ching sult.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on private-
key encryp ion. Th s requi es prior key exchange b tw en particip nt , lthough
there is no s lution o os d to solve this. Th pprox mation used for numerical
onstraints gen rate false positives whose probability of o currence incre e as the
granularity of the di tionary decreases. U fortunat ly, a small dic ionary is required
fo performa ce urpos s because it size a↵ cts the size of the encrypted messages.
If co tainment support s enabl d, encrypted ubscriptions m st includ for each
constraint a bit vector with the size eq al to the numb r of fe e ce values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publicatio s include als a b t vector having th size of
he dictionary. Our study of the scheme furth r revealed that the approximation
phase can als produce false negatives in the co tainment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of in ividual ubscriptions, but it prevents som seful optimizations
a the broker level.
[Ion et al. 012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted ma ching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-u r searchable ata encryption (SDE).
The scheme applie to any numeri a constr i t and o string equalities.
Sch mechanism. We discussed t e gen ralities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encryp ng the publication p yload. Publications can
be decrypted only if an access p licy ssociat d wit t ubsc iber that receives
them is atisfied. The ac e policy s t a sp cific structure for the ubscription
constraints and dicta es the format of publications’ attributes. Constrai ts are
encoded i to an access tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gat s sp cifying
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Encrypted matching te hniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defini g a appropriate dictionary. For instance, for nu erical inequalities, a set
of r f r points are chosen as the dicti nary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the ictionary. Th scheme thu follows a
pre-m pp d equ lity comparison d sig s defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an addition l
reference vector with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment r lations leads to inherent distin-
guishability (although containm nt support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscription ncryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publicati n confidentiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative m tching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the pap r are based on private-
key encryption. This requires prior key exchange between participants, alth ugh
there is no solution proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constrai ts generat s false positives wh se probability of occurrence increase as th
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for performance purposes becaus its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for e ch
constraint a bit v ctor with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the co tainment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some us ful o timizations
at the broker level.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
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En rypted atching tec niq es for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defini g a appropriate dicti nary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of ref ence points are chosen as the d ctionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this c s , a initial approximation of the values is required before encrypti
to pick the closest reference po nt in t e dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
p e-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
contai ment is d t rm ned i a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vect r with approximati poi ts for each constrain .
Security considerations. The rticle p ints out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be btained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ab lity to deter ine con ai men rel tions eads to inherent distin-
guishability (alth ugh containment support s optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, ubscripti n encrypt on is n t semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication confide tiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s bility o distinguish betw en publications, and the analysis shows that
t e nly information leaked is the posi iv or negative matching result.
P actical aspects. All scheme considered in th pap r are based on private-
key ncryption. This r quires pri r key exchange between participants, although
there i no solutio proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints g n at fals positives whose probab lity of occurr nce increase as the
granularity of the dicti nary decreas . Un ortunate y, a s all dictionary is required
for performance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If contain ent support is enabled, e crypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a bi vector with the size equ l to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives in the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
[Ion et al. 2012; 2010b; 2010 ] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
ttr bute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-u er searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies to any num rical cons raint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discus ed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is us d f r encrypt ng the publication payload. Publications can
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Encrypted matching t chnique f r ther types of constraints/attributes ar built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points are chosen s the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
I this case, an initial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containmen is determined in a similar anner. This implies adding an additional
refer nce vector with approximation points for each constraint.
S curity considerations. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that ca be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent distin-
guishabil ty (al hough containmen support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscription encryp is not semantically secure and therefore focus
n publi ation confidentiality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
he broker’s ability to dis inguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
t e only information leaked is the p sitive or negative matching result.
P actical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on private-
key encryption. This equires prior key exchange between participants, although
there s no solution proposed to s lve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints generates false p sitives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for performance purpo es because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is e abled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
co straint a bit vector wi h the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictionary. The e crypted publications include also a bit vector having the size of
the dic ionary. Our study of the sc me further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce f lse negativ s in the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, but it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
[Ion t al. 2012; 2010b; 2010a] present a encrypted matching scheme that uses
attribute-based encryption (ABE) nd multi-user searchable data encryption (SDE).
The scheme applies o any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Sche e mechanism. We di cussed the generalities of ABE in Section 4.1. In
this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload. Publications can
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Encrypted matchi g techniques for other typ s of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate di tionary. For instance, fo numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points re chosen s the dictio ary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation of the values is requir d before e crypt on
to pick th closest reference point in the dict o ry. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in S c ion 4.1. Subscription
containment is dete mined in a similar manner. This implies adding n additional
reference vector with approximation points for each constrain .
Security conside tions. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that c n be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine c n ainment relations eads to inherent distin-
guishability (al hough containment support is optional). The authors ad it that in
such a cas , subscription encryption is not sem nt cally sec re and therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. The particular attack odel ons der d is focused on
the broker’s ability to dist nguish between publicati , nd the an ysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative ma ching result.
Practical aspec s. All schemes considered in the paper are based on priva e-
key ncryption. This requires prior key exchange betw en part cipants, alth ugh
t ere s no solution proposed to solve th . The ap roxim tion use for numerical
constraints genera es false pos tives whose probabi ity f occurrence increase as the
granul r ty of the dictionary decreases. Unf rtun tely, a sm ll dictionary is required
for performance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted me sages.
If containmen support is enabled, encrypted subscrip ions mu t include for each
constr int a bi vector with the size equal to the nu b of referenc v lu s in the
dictionary. The encrypted publications in lud lso having e size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme fur her evealed that th a proximation
phase can also produc false negatives in the conta nment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptio s, b t i prevents some useful optimizatio s
at the broker level.
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Encrypted matching te hniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate diction ry. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of refe nce points are chosen as he dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In th s case, an initial approximation of th values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
reference vector with approxim tion points for each constraint.
Security consideratio s. The article points out the inherent limitation of the
indistinguishability that can be obtained with encrypted matching schemes. For
instance, the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent distin-
uishability (although containment support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a case, subscri tion encryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus
on publication co fidentiality. The particular t ack model considered is focused on
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical asp cts. All schemes onsidered in the paper are based on private-
key encryptio . This requires prior key exchange betwee participants, although
there i no solutio pro osed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constraints generates false p sitives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dicti nary decreas s. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for perf rma ce purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a bit vect r with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
di tionary. The encrypted publications includ also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our s udy of the scheme further revealed that the approximation
phase can also produce false negatives i the containment tests. This does not a↵ect
the matching of individual subscriptions, bu it prevents some useful optimizations
at the broker level.
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Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining an appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a set
of reference points ar chosen as th dictionary ( .g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this case, an initial approximation f the values is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference po n i the dic ion ry. Th sch me thus fol ow a
pre-mapped equal ty compari on design as defined in Secti n 4.1. Subscription
containment i determined in a similar man er. T is implies a di g an additional
refer nce vector with approximation poin s for ea h constraint.
Security considerations. The article poi ts out th inher n limitati of the
indisti guishability that ca be obtained with e c ypted atching s hemes. For
instance, th ability to determi e containmen relations leads o i herent disti -
guishability (although containment support is ptio al). Th authors admit that n
such a case, subscriptio encryption is not semantically secu e a d therefore focus
on publication confidentiality. Th p rticular attack odel c nsid red is f cus d o
the broker’s abili y to distinguish between publicatio s, and the nalysis shows that
the only information leaked is the os tive or negative matching r sult.
Practi al spects. All schemes considered in th paper ar based on priva e-
key encryptio . This requ res rior key exch nge be w en p rticipa s, although
there is no sol t on proposed t solve this. Th ap roxim tion u ed for nu erical
constraints generates false positives whose probability f oc urrence increase a the
granular ty of the dictionary decreas s. Unfortun tely, a small diction ry is required
for performance purposes because its siz a↵ects he ize of the encrypted messages.
If containment support is enabled, e crypted subscriptions must include f r ach
constraint a bit vect r with the size equal to th umber of refer n e v lues in the
dictionary. The ncrypted publ catio s includ also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our study of the scheme further reve l d hat the approximatio
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E crypted matching techniques for ther types of constraints/attributes are built
by defining n appropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequalities, a s t
of ref rence points are h sen as th dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
I this case, an i itial approximation of the valu s is required before encryption
to pick the closest reference poi t in the dic ionary. The scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped quality co par son des gn s defined in Se tion 4.1. Subscription
con ai ment is deter ined i a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
eference ector with approximatio points for each constraint.
Security co sid ati s. T e article poi ts out the inherent limitation of the
i distin uishability tha ca be obtained wit encrypted matc ing schemes. F r
instance, t e ability to etermi e contain ent relatio s leads to inherent distin-
guishabilit (alt oug co ainment support is optional). The authors admit that i
such a case, subs r ption cry tion is t semantically secure and therefore focus
o ublicatio confide t ality. The particular attack model considered is focused on
the broker’s abili y to distinguish b tween publications, and the analysis shows that
the only information l ak d is the p sitive or negative matching result.
Practi al aspects. All schemes considered in the pa er are based on private-
key enc yp i . This requires prior key xchange between participants, although
h re is no solution propo ed to olve thi . The approximation used for numerical
co straints generates false positives who e probability of occurrence increase as the
gran l rity of dict on y decr a s. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for p rformance purposes because its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If co tainm nt support s ena led, e crypted subscriptions must include for each
constraint a it vector with th size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictiona y. T e encrypted publicati ns include also a bit vector having the size of
the dictionary. Our st y of the sche e further re ealed that the approximation
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0  g1
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Etienne Istopped rewriting hereJ
Encrypted matching techniques for other types of constraints/attributes are built
by d fining an ppropriate dictionary. For instance, for numerical inequal ties, a set
of reference points are chosen as the dictionary (e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}).
In this cas , an nitial approximation of the values is required before encryption
to pick he c se t reference point i the d cti nary. Th scheme thus follows a
pre-mapped equality comparison d s gn as defi ed in S ctio 4.1. Subscription
c ntainment is determin d in a similar manner. This implies adding an additional
r fe ence vector with approximation points f r each constraint.
Sec rity consid rations. The article poin s out the inherent limitation of the
i distinguishability that can be obtained with enc y d matching schemes. For
insta ce, the ability to determine containment relations eads to inherent distin-
g ish bility (although containmen support is optional). The authors admit that in
such a cas , subscription encryption is ot sem ntically secure and therefore focus
n publica confidentiality. The parti ular attack model considered is focused on
b ker’s ability to distingu sh between publications, and the analysis shows that
the o ly inf rmation leaked is the positive or nega ive matching result.
Practical spects. All scheme onsidered in th paper are based on private-
ke encryption. This requires prior key exchange betwee participants, although
there is no solution proposed to solve this. The approximation used for numerical
constrai ts generates false positives whose probability of occurrence increase as the
granularity of the dictionary decreases. Unfortunately, a small dictionary is required
for p formanc purposes becaus its size a↵ects the size of the encrypted messages.
If containmen support is enabled, encrypted subscriptions must include for each
c stra nt a bit v ctor with the size equal to the number of reference values in the
dictiona y. The e crypted publications include al o a bit vector having the size of
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11. FOR THE RAICU EXAMPLE
1
d
 X
 Y
⇤X = EK1 ( X)
⇤Y = EK1 ( Y )
⇤X
⇤Y
key ⇤X = FK2 (⇤X)
key ⇤Y = FK2 (⇤Y )
r1
r2
r⇤Y
r4
r⇤X
g1
g2
g⇤Y
g4
g⇤X
i
ri = FK2 (i)
gi = Gri (R)
0  g1
0  g⇤Y
1  g⇤X
Ji = gi   P 0i
P 0
J
One test per keyword in encsub
as (⇤X , key ⇤X ,⇤Y , key ⇤Y ),
agai st encpub as (J,R):
(X) J [⇤X ] Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1 (match)
(Y) J [⇤Y ] Gkey ⇤Y (R) = 0 (no match)
J [⇤Y ] Gkey ⇤Y (R) = (no match)
J [⇤X ] Gkey ⇤X (R) = 1 (match)
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subsc ibers a d publishers who mi ht need co mon k y inf rmation. Second,
encrypted subscriptions stor d by brok rs are inv lidated by a key refr sh; t is can
cause service disruptio . None of the encrypted matching schemes we overv ew
proposes r referenc s a key management alternative hat address s b th of these
issues: Hugues II would cite our middl ware paper here.J
• In most cases, key manag ment is imply conside e a rthogonal problem
decou led from th cr ptographic mechanism, and is requi ed from n external
entity.
• F r schemes relyin on trib te-b sed ncryp , key information is a so i ted
with the content f the pub/sub m ssages rath r than with particul r sys
pa ties. This attempt o reduce the coupling equired by h key exchange.
• The pub/sub functional m del is modified towards a less decoupled model, ther -
for allowing more straightforward designs for key management.
K ma agement is a op n a challenging iss e for pub/ ub syst ms, fa fr m
b ing satisfacto ily solved by current esearch. For this reason, challenges and
directions tow rds poten ial solutions are discussed in etails in Sec ion 5.
4.2 Ov rvie of ncr pted matching solutions
D
Etienne Ifill the t ble II with the description of he complexities and refer to the table in
the text below.J
In the following we overview exis ing content-bas d pub/sub encrypted matching
schemes. Many of these schemes use complex mechanisms, sometimes partially
changed over di↵erent published versions of the same scheme. We present a summa-
rized view of the architecture of these mech nisms, which identifi s the algorithms
used for matching according to the classification we established in Section 4.1.1:
based on an exact relation preserving isomorphism or on a pre-mapped equality
comparison. We dwelve into particular mechanism details only when n cessary for
a bett r understanding of the scheme. Therefore, we often use a di↵erent, simplified
notation compared to the original articles. In our discussion we generically use the
notation E(x) for ciph text obtained using an encryption algorithm E applied to
the plaintext x, and D(y) for a decryption algorithm D applied to a ciphertext y.
If the context is not general and implies the use of a particular key K, the notation
we use is EK(x) and DK(y). Figure 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the
representative olutions surveyed in this section.
[Choi et al. 2010] describes a solution using asymm tric s al product-pres rving
encryption (ASPE). ASPE was nitially introduced by [Wong et al. 2009] for secure
kNN qu ry om utatio n encrypted databas s. The s l o ppl es to ny
numerical constraints.
S heme me hanism. Publication attrib t s nd subscription constraints are
represented as coordinates of multidi ens n l poi ts. The si pl 1-dimensi n a e
is shown in Figure 6. Consider a subscr p io point S a d a publication point P
that must be matched. Wi hout loss of gener li y, suppos ha we want to find
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subsc i ers a d publishers who mi ht need common key inf rmation. Second,
encry ted subscr ptions tor d by brok rs are inv lidated by a key refr sh; t is c n
cause service d sruptio . None of the encrypted matching schemes we overv ew
proposes r refere c s a key manageme t al ernative hat addr ss s b th of th se
issues: Hugues II would cite our middlew re paper here.J
• In most cases, key management is simply consider d an orthogonal problem
decoupled from the cryptographic mechanism, a d is required from an external
entity.
• F r chemes relyin on att ibute-based ncrypti n, key info mation is ass i ted
with the content f th pub/sub m ssages rath r than with par icul r s ste
pa ties. This at mpts o r uce the co pling equired by th key exchange.
• The pub/sub functional m d l is modified owa ds a l ss decoupled mod l, there-
fore allowing mor straightforward designs for key ma age ent.
K managem t is a op a d chall ngin issue for pub/sub systems, fa from
being satisfactorily solved by curr nt r s arch. For this reason, challenge and
directions to ards po ntial solut ons are discussed in details in Section 5.
4.2 Overview of e crypted matching solutions
D
Etienne Ifill the table II with the description of the complexities and refer to the table in
the text below.J
In the following we overview existing content-based pub/sub encrypted matching
schemes. Many of these schemes use complex mechanisms, sometimes partially
changed over di↵erent published versions of the same scheme. We present a summa-
rized view of the architecture of these mechanisms, which identifies the algorithms
used for matching according to the classification we established in Section 4.1.1:
based on an exact relation preserving isomorphis or o a pre-mapped equalit
comparison. We dwelve into particular mecha ism details only when ecessary for
a better understanding of the scheme. Therefore, we often use a di↵erent, simplified
notation compared to the original articles. In our discussion we generically use t e
notation E(x) for a ciphertext btained using an encryption algorithm E applied to
the plaintext x, and D(y) for a decryption algorithm D applied to a ciphertext y.
If the context is ot general and implies the use of a particular key K, the notatio
we use is EK(x) and DK(y). Figure 5 summarizes the main characteristics of the
representative solutions surveyed in this section.
[Choi et al. 2010] describes a solution using asymmetric s alar product-preserving
encryption (ASPE). ASPE was initially introduced by [Wong et al. 2009] for secure
kNN qu ry omputation n encrypted databases. The solution applies to any
numerical constraints.
Scheme mechanism. Publication attributes and sub criptions const ai ts are
represented as coordinates of multidimensional points. T e simple 1-dimension case
is show in Figure 6. Consider a subscription point S and a publication point P
that must be matched. Without loss of generality, suppose that we want to find
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Fig. 8: Dict onary-b sed encrypt d a c g f r c junctive s membership in [R iciu a d Rosen-
blum 2006].
P and S can e mo el d s the indexes λ of t eir items in t e diction ry, .e., P = {λX , λY }
and S = {λX} (|P | a d |S| d ot t s z f P nd S, espectiv ly). The first step of the
encryptio fo h the publ cat n the u c i t on is to permut hese λ indexes using
a first hared keyed pseu rand ti f ncti EK1 . This results in permuted
indexes Λ ∈ [1 . . . ], .g., ΛX = EK1(λX). Th ses index s Λ are used similarly to attribute
a and c nstraint c in th quality atchi g ch e.
On the su scri tion de, F is used w t pa amet r K2 to crypt ΛX and ΛY , resulting
in key ΛX = FK2(ΛX) nd key ΛY = FK2(ΛY ). The crypt d sub cription encsub formed
of the two p irs (ΛX , k y ΛX ,ΛY , key ΛY ) i en to th untrusted broker.
On the p lication s d , he ncryptio ses thr e additional steps. First, the scheme
applies FK2 to all ndex po i io s ∈ [1 . . . D] th dictionary (not only the ones present
in the pu li a io ). Thi yield D val r = FK2(i), whi h a e used as keys for another
pseudorando func ion G applied t r ndom v lue R. This results in a vector of encrypted
diction y in xes gi, i ∈ [1 . . . D] where gi = Gri(R). Finally, in order to differentiate
the indexes of ttributes pre nt in the p lication from the ones that are not, values gi
correspon i g to th permut d index s Λ of the publication are XOR’d (operation ⊕) with
a vector of 1s. The resulting vector is denoted J . The encrypted publication encpub sent to
the untrusted broker is the pair (J,R). If JΛX ⊕Gkey ΛX (R) = 1, keyword X appears in the
publication. If all constraints of the subscription are matched, the publication matches the
subscription.
For inequality constraints, a variant of the set membership encrypted matching scheme
can be applied through the use of an appropriate dictionary. Numerical inequalities can be
supported by choosing a set of reference points and ordering guarantees as the dictionary,
e.g., {< 1, < 3, < 5, > 1, > 3, > 5}. In this case, an initial approximation of the values is
required before encryption to pick the closest reference point in the dictionary. The scheme
thus follows a pre-mapped equality comparison design as defined in Section 4.1. Subscription
containment is determined in a similar manner by adding an additional reference vector
with approximation points for each constraint.
Security considerations. Two identical subscriptions S1 and S2 will be encrypted as
the same encsub, and the ability to determine containment relations leads to inherent
distinguishability (even if containment support is optional). The authors thus admit that
in such a case, subscription encryption is not semantically secure and therefore focus on
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AND
u ≥ 9 v ≥ 12
2
(AND)
2
(AND)
2
(AND)
u = 1???
u = ?1?? u = ???1u = ??1?
v = 1??? v = ?1??1
(OR)
Fig. 9: Subscription representation after attribute-based encryption (ABE) using four bits.
the broker’s ability to distinguish between publications. The analysis shows that the only
information leaked is the positive or negative matching result.
Practical aspects. All schemes considered in the paper are based on symmetric-key encryp-
tion, and require prior key (and dictionary) exchange between participants. No solution is
propose to enable this exchange.
For equality constraints, the scheme requires the individual encryption of each of the
|C| (dimension, value) constraints in the subscription and one corresponding comparison
operation in the matching phase. The matching equality complexity is therefore in O(|C|).
For conjunctive set membership, the space complexity for a subscription is in O(|S|), two
values per item in the set. Supporting containment requires an additional vector of size D
for each item, raising subscription space complexity to O(|S| ×D). Subscription encryption
complexity is also in O(|S|). Publication encryption requires operations on all the elements
of D-sized vectors, irrespective of the number of attributes: space and time complexities
are thus in O(D). Finally, matching consists of |S| operations on single elements from the
encrypted publication vector J and random R and is therefore in O(|S|).
For inequalities, the complexity of the subscriptions is unchanged. On average half (D2 )
of the dictionary entries will be set for the publications, but as the space and encryption
complexity for publications was already O(D), it remains identical.
While a small dictionary size D is recommended for performance purposes for set mem-
bership subscriptions, we observe that for inequalities D corresponds to a cost-accuracy
tradeoff: a small dictionary size will result in many false positives and increased traffic of
unwanted publications towards subscribers, whereas a large value of D increases costs.
We finally observe that the approximation phase used for the containment tests can also
produce false negatives. While this does not affect the matching of individual subscriptions,
this can decrease the effectiveness of optimizations based on containment relations between
subscriptions: an actual containment relation between two subscriptions might not be
discovered, preventing from using positive matching as discussed in Section 2.1.
[Ion et al. 2010a; Ion et al. 2010b; Ion et al. 2012] present an encrypted matching
scheme that uses attribute-based encryption (ABE) and multi-user searchable data encryption
(SDE). The scheme applies to any numerical constraint and to string equalities.
Scheme mechanism. We discussed the generalities of ABE, a form of functional encryp-
tion, in Section 4.1. In this scheme, ABE is used for encrypting the publication payload.
Publications can be decrypted only if an access policy associated with the subscriber that
receives them is satisfied. The access policy sets a specific structure for the subscription
constraints and dictates the format of publications’ attributes. Constraints are encoded into
an access tree in which non-leaf nodes are threshold gates specifying the number of subtrees
that need to be satisfied. As an illustration, consider the subscription with two constraints
{u ≥ 9, v ≥ 12} shown in Figure 9. This subscription results in a root node with a value of
2, meaning that both subtrees (one per constraint) must be satisfied. The constraints are
expanded following the representation in [Bethencourt et al. 2007]. At most one leaf-node
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token per bit is required in order to make a decision. For the predicate “v ≥ 12” using a
4-bit representation, the constraint subtree will have a leaf-node with v = 1*** (“bit 1 of v
must be 1”) and a leaf-node with v = *1** (“bit 2 of v must be 1”) joined by a parent “AND”
node. Publication attributes are also split into tokens with 1 bit set (e.g., v = 12 is split
as {v = 1***, v = *1**, v = **0*, v = ***0}). The matching scheme follows the generic
pre-mapped equality comparison design we defined in Section 4.1. We now detail how the
publication’s tokens and the similarly structured subscription leaf nodes are encrypted in
order for the matching to be possible over ciphertexts.
Publisher Untrusted Broker Subscriber
encrypted matching:
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6. FIGURE 6
attribute = a
random = R
key a = FK(a)
encpub = Fkey a(R)
encpub
?
= Fkey c(R)
constraint c
key c = FK(c)
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8. FIGURE SPLIT KEY
attribute = a
constraint c
a0 = E1pxp1,s0 (a)
c0 = E1pxs1,s0 (c)
E2pxp2 (a
0) ⇠ E2pxs2 (c0)
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8. FIGURE SPLIT KEY
attribute = a
constraint c
a0 = E1pxp1,s0 (a)
c0 = E1sxs1,s0 (c)
E2pxp2 (a
0) ⇠ E2sxs2 (c0)
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8. FIGURE SPLIT KEY
attribute = a
constraint c
a0 = E1pxp1,s0 (a)
c0 = E1sxs1,s0 (c)
E2pxp2 (a
0) ⇠ E2sxs2 (c0)
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Fig. 10: SDE private key usage applied in pub/sub context ( ∼ denotes the matching operation at
the broker)
The tokens with 1 bit set obtained from publications and subscriptions are encrypted
using multi-user SDE [Dong et al. 2008]. This technique adapts the public key El Gamal
scheme [El Gamal 1985] to a proxy re-encryption context. A trusted authority generates the
public key parameters and a private key formed by two components x and s0. The private
part s0 is known to both the publisher and subscriber, but not to the broker. The central
idea of the scheme is to split the private key x in two pieces for each pair formed by an end
node (publisher or subscriber) and the edge broker through which that end node sends and
receives messages. The sketch in Figure 10 summarizes the technique. The private key x used
for encryption by both the publisher and subscriber is split in two parts for each of these
and the broker between them: x = xp1 + xp2 where xp1 is given to the publisher and xp2 to
the broker, and x = xs1 + xs2 where xs1 is given to the subscriber and xs2 to the broker.
We can generalize the mechanism by saying that for each of the communicating end nodes i
connected to a broker, the common key x is split into xi1 which is given to the end node and
xi2 which is given to the broker. The end node performs an initial encryption E1 in which
his private part xi1 and s0 are used. The broker performs a re-encryption E2 using his part
of the private secret xi2. The purpose of splitting the same key x in different pairs of xi1 and
xi2 is the application of the proxy re-encryption mechanism. We abstract the details of the
effective algorithms used in encryption, which differ for publications and subscriptions. The
main idea of the scheme is that each end node-broker pair can share the same key x. Only
the splits of x for the end node and the broker differ. Therefore, the ciphertexts obtained in
the two steps (initial encryption and re-encryption) are comparable, being finally encrypted
with the same key material, and the matching can be determined. However, subscribers
use a different random parameter in the encryption of each s bscription. This does not
impact the matching but prevents brokers from determining containment relations between
subscriptions ciphertexts.
Security considerations. Subscription confidentiality is analyzed using a chosen plaintext
attack (CPA) model; for publication confidentiality the scheme is evaluated using a model
similar to the one in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006], the goal being that nothing is leaked to
an adversary besides the results observed from matching history traces. The analysis uses
the fact that the employed El Gamal mechanism is proven CPA secure. Finally, the payload
confidentiality provided by ABE is proven secure under a stronger threat model that takes
into account the possibility of collusion between subscribers, publishers and brokers.
Practical aspects. Besides encrypted matching, the paper also describes an access control
model that can be applied to more complex scenarios like the e-Health use case detailed in
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7. FIGURE 7
E0( c) = D0 (Epkey( c))
C¯ = Brm (E
0( c))
attribute = a
E0(a) = D0 (Epkey(a))
A¯ = Br,rm (E
0(a))
di↵µ(A¯, C¯)
?
= rm(a  c) + r
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Fig. 11: Encrypted matching mechanism in [Nabeel et al. 2012] (pkey and µ are public parameters,
λ, r and rm are private parameters, A¯ and C¯ respectively denote blinded attributes and
constraints values, n is the size of the Paillier plaintext space, and ∼ is the matching
comparison operation).
Section 2.3. The access control model relies on restrictions that can be imposed on various
groups of subscribers through ABE. This fits with a multi-domain context such as the one
in the e-Health use case. Also, using ABE for publication payload encryption could be an
appropriate solution for typical additional data included in the messages that might require
selective authorized decryption rights (e.g., publications can include blood test analysis,
X-rays, etc. accessible to only part of the medical personnel determined through a particular
ABE access policy). The paper does not discuss the support of containment determination.
However, in an e-Health scenario the system load is expected to be relatively light compared
to the stock exchange use case, and therefore the lack of containment optimization is less
critical.
The scheme was integrated to the PADRES [Jacobsen et al. 2010] pub/sub middleware
for its evaluation, and tested in an e-Health context. [Ion et al. 2012] reports that the
matching time increases linearly with the number of comparisons done between constraint
and attribute tokens. A constraint subtree can have at most m leaf-nodes, and an attribute
token set has m elements where m is the number of bits used to represent a value. The
worst-case scenario is that each attribute token with 1 bit set must be compared with each
leaf-node token with 1 bit set, thus the maximum number of comparisons per constraint is
m2 in the general case. This results in a matching complexity in O(|C| ·m2) comparisons
per subscription. If subscriptions include only equality constraints, these do not have to
be expanded to leaf node tokens with 1 bit set, and neither d the publication attributes:
encrypted tokens can be represented directly by the constraint and attribute values, which
results in only one comparison per constraint. The general cost is, however, higher than
other schemes using similar data representation (i.e., [Li et al. 2004]), although the privacy
guarantees are also stronger.
The article considers the lack of need for key exchange as a decoupling advantage. However,
this does not eliminate the need for common key material between communicating peers.
The difference is that this key material is not exchanged between participants, but is instead
retrieved from a trusted authority.
[Nabeel et al. 2009; Nabeel et al. 2012; Nabeel et al. 2013] present a solution
applicable for any constraints on numerical values based on the public-key Paillier cryptosys-
tem [Paillier 1999]. The Paillier cryptosystem has the property that E(x) ·E(y) = E(x+ y),
and the private key uses two components λ and µ in the decryption phase.
Scheme mechanism. In the first two versions of the scheme [Nabeel et al. 2009; Nabeel
et al. 2012], subscribers know in advance the publishers from whom they wish to receive
publications, and publishers are also aware of this intention. A sketch summarizing the
encrypted matching is shown in Figure 11. The scheme follows the exact relation preserving
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isomorphism design described in Section 4.1.1 through the use of the homomorphic properties
of the Paillier cryptosystem.
In an initial phase, the subscriber encrypts the negation of each constraint value c using its
own public key pkey, obtaining Epkey(−c). These values are sent to the publisher from which
the subscriber wants to receive the publications. The publisher then applies an additional
blinding layer on top of the received Paillier encryption:
• It applies a part of the Paillier decryption operation that consists in an exponentiation using
the secret λ parameter, which we denote D′ and whose result is E′(−c): D′λ(Epkey(−c)) =
Epkey(−c)λ = E′(−c);
• It applies an additional encryption B with a private random component rm to obtain the
blinded value Brm(E
′(−c)).
Blinded encrypted constraints are sent back to the subscriber, who registers the encrypted
subscriptions with the broker. The publisher uses a similar technique to encrypt and blind
each publication attribute a using the same separate private rm and an extra random
parameter r to derive Br,rm(E
′(a)). For matching, the broker is given the second part of the
Paillier private key µ. Using µ and the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem,
the broker is able to perform a computation diff over the blinded attribute and constraint.
This computation completes the Paillier decryption and results in
diff µ (Br,rm(E
′(a)), Brm(E
′(−c))) = rm(a− c) + r = d′.
The scheme assumes that the domain for the attributes and constraints values (a and c)
can be approximated to the interval [0, 2l], where 2l  n, n being the upper limit of the
plaintext space of the Paillier cryptosystem. Since the domain used in the pub/sub scenario
is much smaller than the plaintext space, the difference result a− c can be mapped in the
mutually exclusive intervals [0, 2l] if a ≥ c and [n− 2l, n] if a < c. The random values rm
and r in the diff result, chosen in controlled range, obfuscate the actual a− c difference and
permit expanding the mapping intervals to the complete plaintext space. If d′ ≤ n/2 then
the broker can conclude that a ≥ c, respectively a < c if d′ > n/2.
Containment is optionally supported through a similar technique. Another private pa-
rameter rc can be used by the subscriber to obtain separate blindings for the constraints
values in a subscription, and their negations (e.g., Br,rc(E
′(c)), Brc(E
′(−c))). This allows
the broker to compute differences as diff above for two constraints values c1, c2 blinded in
this manner:
diff 1(Br1,rc(E
′(c1)), Brc(E
′(−c2))) = rc(c1 − c2) + r1;
diff 2(Br2,rc(E
′(c2)), Brc(E
′(−c1))) = rc(c2 − c1) + r2.
(where r1 and r2 are random values). The broker can derive containment based on these results.
An aspect to consider is that the same value rc must be used in blinding the constraints
values in different subscriptions. Unless an agreement on the value can be established between
different subscribers, containment can be leveraged only between subscriptions of the same
subscriber.
The latest variation of the scheme [Nabeel et al. 2013] introduces a context manager.
It acts as a trusted entity, is responsible for managing contexts represented by sets of
attributes in publications, and distributes the security parameters required for encryption
and blinding in a certain context. The encrypted matching computation performed on the
brokers remains essentially the same as presented previously. However, [Nabeel et al. 2013]
does not mention explicitly containment support. In this version of the scheme a subscriber
no longer communicates directly with the publisher for the initial blinding phase of the
subscription. Subscribers receive the security parameters necessary for obtaining the blinded
result from the context manager. In addition to the encrypted matching support based
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on the Paillier scheme, the solution uses attribute based encryption for the publication
payload. Key distribution uses a specific attribute-based group key management (AB-GKM)
scheme [Nabeel and Bertino 2011]. Subscribers can derive payload decryption keys using
attribute credentials in their possession along with public key information. This permits
enforcing functional-encryption-based access control by allowing only restricted sets of
subscribers to decrypt payloads.
Security considerations. The blinding operations following the Paillier encryption are
considered secure to chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). The change of the private µ parameter
in the Paillier cryptosystem into a public one is argued as safe in [Nabeel et al. 2013]. The
authors base their argument on the difficulty for an attacker to derive the other secret λ
parameter, needed along µ.
Practical aspects. The drawback of the first two versions of the scheme [Nabeel et al.
2012; Nabeel et al. 2009] is the tight coupling between publishers and subscribers, which is
unrealistic and impractical for several applications. The initial communication phase from
the subscriber to the publishers must take place for every subscription, which is no longer
necessary with the context manager introduced in the latest iteration of the scheme [Nabeel
et al. 2013]. However, the solution still requires a loose level of coupling between publishers
and subscribers, i.e., the security parameters needed for the Paillier encryption and blinding
specific to each publication context (for a publisher and the subscribers interested specifically
in the publications of that publisher).
The matching complexity is as follows. The broker must execute one diff comparison for
each constraint, as displayed in Figure 11. This results in a matching complexity in O(|C|)
operations per subscription. While neither of the three papers presents a computational
complexity analysis, the experimental evaluation in [Nabeel et al. 2013] illustrates this linear
scaling behavior in the number of constraints.
We consider that this solution presents interesting features in practice for a variety of use
cases, including both our motivating e-Health example detailed in Section 2.3 as well as the
stock market scenario referred in Section 1.2. However, it also has several drawbacks. The
scheme supports encrypted matching only for numerical values. This might be a problem for
the e-Health use case, although for evaluating simple equality constraints, small domains like
defined sets of patient names and injuries could be mapped to numerical values. The first
two versions of the scheme explicitly support containment. Optimizations relying on this
would be useful in scenarios where the system load is high like the stock market scenario. On
the other hand, the tight publisher/subscriber coupling in these first two versions impairs
scalability. This is solved in the latest scheme iteration, but no longer addresses containment.
The latest scheme version supports publication payload encryption using an ABE mechanism.
As in the case of [Ion et al. 2012] this would be specifically useful in the e-Health scenario
for securely transporting additional data like patient analysis results, X-rays, etc., to be
decrypted only by selective categories of medical personnel. This feature helps in a potential
application of the scheme to the multi domain architecture in the e-Health use case. Finally,
the security analysis of the scheme gives stronger results than ASPE [Choi et al. 2010] which
makes it more reliable in case of highly sensitive applications like the stock exchange use
case.
[Li et al. 2004] presents a scheme that preserves the ability to determine shared prefixes
between an encrypted publication attribute and an encrypted subscription constraint. The
data representation using bit prefixes presents similarities to the one used by [Ion et al.
2012].
Scheme mechanism. Subscription constraints are expressed through closed intervals over
finite domains. These intervals correspond to a set of admissible prefixes, and a publication
attribute value that falls into the interval shares one of the prefixes. Consider, as an example,
the interval i = [32, 111]. Using one-byte representation, the set of prefixes corresponding
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Fig. 12: Bit-flip based prefix-preserving permutation of [Li et al. 2004].
to the interval is I = {001*, 010*, 0110*}. Any value in the interval c will have a common
prefix with one of the elements of I. For instance, value a = 64 = 01000000 matches the
prefix 010*.
Attribute values and prefixes for the subscription constraints must be encrypted so that
prefix matching remains possible. This is achieved through a pseudorandom permutation of
the bits. Plaintext prefixes can be represented using a binary tree with a bit flip flag at each
non-leaf node, as shown in Figure 12. When a flag is true (black nodes in Figure 12), the bits
of its children branches are flipped. The complete tree permutation is the common key used
by subscribers and publishers to encrypt constraint prefixes and attribute values. Matching
between ciphertexts is thus the same operation as plaintext matching, and the technique
is in essence a pre-mapped equality comparison. The paper does not discuss containment
determination, however it can be provided in a straightforward manner since the prefixes of
a contained encrypted subscription will match the prefixes of its containers.
Security considerations. The authors mention that the scheme has limited resistance under
a KPA attack model. Subscription confidentiality and publication confidentiality can only
be guaranteed under a weaker ciphertext-only-attack (COA).
Practical aspects. The scheme requires a secret key to determine a common permutation
for the publisher and the subscriber, but this key exchange is considered as an orthogonal
problem.
The matching complexity for each of the c constraints is in O(m), where m is the number
of bits used in the representation. The total matching complexity is therefore in O(|C| ·m),
which is less than the O(|C| ·m2) complexity of [Ion et al. 2012] that also relies on a bit
token representation and prefix matching. The difference is due to the maximum size of
a constraint interval prefix set, which is 2(m − 1) in [Li et al. 2004]. Unfortunately, this
performance advantage comes at the price of offering only COA security, which is a security
limitation compared to the CPA-resilience guaranteed in [Ion et al. 2012].
[Tariq et al. 2010; Tariq et al. 2014] consider confidentiality preservation in a peer-to-
peer pub/sub architecture. The encrypted matching scheme is based on attribute-based
encryption (ABE). It supports numerical comparisons and prefix/suffix constraints on strings.
The system model differs from a broker-based approach. Each peer in the system participates
to the collective operation of providing the pub/sub service to itself and other peers, as
in [Choi et al. 2004; Gupta et al. 2004; Voulgaris et al. 2006]. A peer can simultaneously act
as a publisher and a subscriber. Publications are delivered through an overlay connecting
all subscribers and structured as a set of containment-based trees. Each subscriber is
responsible for matching incoming publications against its subscription, and to disseminate
the publication according to containment rules. Since the actual matching is performed by
the subscribers themselves and not by an untrusted third party, the trust assumptions differ
from a broker-based system as described below.
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Fig. 13: Domain decomposition principle of [Tariq et al. 2014].
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signature purposes. A publisher first encrypts the publication P with a locally
generated secret symmetric encryption algorithm with key SK (e.g., using AES).
This yields CTP as ciphertext. Then, it encrypts SK into CTSK using MPu and
some local random values generated for each attribute i in the publication. These
random values, along with parameters of MPu, are used to generate another series
of ciphertexts {CTij}, one for each credential and covering credentials Cij of each
attribute in the publication. Due to the inclusion of the covering credentials, any
peer who subscribed to a matching criteria covering the publication will be able to
match and decrypt it.
Ciphertexts CTP , CTSK and {CTij} are sent into the pub/sub peer-to-peer overlay
and disseminated towards subscribers following containment relations between
subscribers. Upon reception of the encrypted publication, subscribers first try to
decrypt SK using the set of private keys Prsij that they obtained for subscription
credentials and the set of {CTij} they received along with the publication. Then,
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encrypted matching operation in the scheme. If the decrypted publication includes a
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Fig. 15: Attribute tree in the [Tariq et al. 2014] scheme overlay.
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Practical aspects. Public key encryption is typically costlier than symmetric
encryption. This justifies encrypting the actual publication content (which might
be of arbitrary size) with a symmetric cipher and key SK, and to rely on public key
encryption only for the shorter plaintext that is SK itself. However, this does not
prevent from having to decrypt all publications using SK in order to e↵ectively find
whether the result of the matching operation, even on peers that will eventually not
be interested in the publication.
Decrypting SK requires the subscriber to use the private keys for each one of the
credentials associated to the constraints in its subscription. The article reports a
decryption and implicitly also matching complexity of O(d) per subscription where
d is the size of the attribute schema. This is simply based on a number of product
iterations to be executed by the decryption operation, but this does not specifically
analyze the cost of other component computations.
The peer-to-peer system model where the service is provided through the in-
teraction of ordinary peers rather than by a set of dedicated brokers leads to the
following changes. First, subscriptions are not e↵ectively disseminated in the system
but kept at the peer that emits them. Consequently, the cryptographic scheme
does not include an actual subscription encryption and targets only a weak form
of subscription confidentiality, discussed further below. Second, subscriber peers
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Fig. 15: Attribute tree in the [ ariq et al. 2014] scheme overlay.
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Decrypting SK requires the subscriber to u e the private keys for each one of the
credentials associated to the constraints in its subscription. The article reports a
decryption and implicitly also matching complexity of O(d) per subscription where
d is the size of the attribute schema. This is simply based on a number of product
iterations to be executed by the decryption operation, but this does not specifically
analyze the cost of other component computations.
The peer-to-peer system model where the service is provided through the in-
teraction of ordinary peers rather than by a set of dedicated brokers leads to the
following changes. First, subscriptions are not e↵ectively disseminated in the system
but kept at the peer that emits them. Consequently, the cryptographic scheme
does not include an actual subscription encryption and targets only a weak form
of subscription confidentiality, discussed further below. Second, subscriber peers
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signature purposes. A publisher first encrypts the publication P with a locally
generated secret symmetric encryption algorithm with key SK (e.g., using AES).
This yields CTP as ciphertext. Then, it encrypts SK into CTSK using MPu and some
local random values bi generated for each attribute i in the publication. These
random values, along with parameters of MPu, are used to generate another series
of ciphertexts {CTij}, one for each credential and covering credentials Cij of each
attribute in the publication. Due to the inclusion of the covering credentials, any
peer who subscribed to a matching criteria covering the publication will be able to
match and decrypt it.
Ciphertexts CTP , CTSK and {CTij} are sent into the pub/sub peer-to-peer overlay
and disseminated towards subscribers following containment relations between
subscribers. Upon reception of the encrypted publication, subscribers first try to
decrypt SK using the set of private keys Prsij that they obtained for subscription
credentials and the set of {CTij} they received along with the publication. Then,
subscribers can attempt to use SK to decrypt the actual publication. This decrypt on
can only succeed if the SK obtained is correct, which depends on the matching of the
encrypted credentials. This preliminary decryption of SK can be considered as the
encrypted matching operation in the scheme. If the decrypted publication includes a
specific padding or a hash that was appended before encryption, then the matching
is positive, otherwise the obtained SK is not correct and the matching is negative.
Temporary notations update:
—MPK — MPu
—MSK — MPr
—Pupij — Pu
p
ij
—Prpij — Pr
p
ij
—Pusij — Pu
s
ij
—Prsij — Pr
s
ij
—Credij — Cij
—SK — SK
—CTPub — CTP
—CTSK — CTSK
—CTij — {CT j}
MPu (master publ c k y)
MPr (master private key)
Pr
p
ij = EMPr,MPu(Cij)
Prsij = EMPr,MPu(Cij)
Pu
p
ij   Cij
Pr
p
ij (publisher private key)
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Practical aspects. Public key encryption is typically costlier than symmetric
encryption. This justifies encrypting the actual publication content (which might
be of arbitrary size) with a symmetric cipher and key SK, and to rely on public key
encryption only for the shorter plaintext that is SK itself. However, this does not
prevent from having to decrypt all publications using SK in order to e↵ectively find
whether the result of the matching operation, even on peers that will eventually not
be interested in the publication.
Decrypting SK requires the subscriber to use the private keys for each one of the
creden als associated to the constraints i its subscription. The article reports a
d cryptio and implicitly a so matching complexity of O(d) per subscription where
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12. TAREQ
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Fig. 14: Decryp ion sche e eq ivale t with atchi g functi nality i [Tariq e al. 2014].
Scheme mechanis . The encrypted ma hi g chem follows a pre-mapp d qual ty
compariso de ign. Subscrip con tr in s and ublica ion a tribut s re mapped to
bit strings. Fo numerical v lu s, the multi- im nsi al attribute space is partitioned by
splitting it alternatively ove it d m nsi ns. Fig re 13 llus ates a domai p rtiti n for
two dimensions. Each slice maps to a it stri g, reflecting which partition is considered
at each st p of the split. While publications can be ass ciated to a single slice, and thus
to the longest possible bit string, subscriptions are associated to the smallest slice that
contains their area of interest entirely. Matching is performed by simple prefix matching:
if publication P = {a = 12, b = 17} corresponds to the bit string 001 and subscription
S = {a < 50 ∧ b < 50} correspon s o bit string 00, P matches S as 00 is a prefix of
001. Containment is determined similarly. False positives are possible. The matching and
containment accuracy depend on several factors, such as the partitioning granularity, the
generalit or narrowness f subscriptio s, and whether the range of the subscriptions overlaps
the splitting poin s. As in [Raic u and Rosenblum 2006], a good partitioning is fundamental
to reach performance and scalability, and to avoid a high level of false positives. String
matching follows the same principle: suffix matching requires a mapping that considers
strings in heir r verse order.
Similarly as in [Ion et al. 2012], bit strings are used as credentials for publications and
subscriptio s in an encryption scheme built upon ABE [Bethencourt et al. 2007]. We denote
the credentials for publications and subscriptions as Cij , where i represents the attribute
and j the effective credential for that attribute (e.g., 001). We summarize the functional
principles of the scheme in Figure 14, and give details below.
The central and trusted authority acts as a key server. It provides its master public key
MPu for publication encryption. The corresponding master private key MPr is used by the
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Fig. 15: Attribute tree in the [Tariq et al. 2014] scheme overlay.
key server for generating specific private keys associated to credentials of publications and
subscriptions as follows.
For each credential Cij , a peer generates public keys Pu
p
ij and/or Pu
s
ij . These include the
credentials for publication attributes and subscription constraints, respectively. Peers then
send these public keys to the key server. Based on the credentials they contain, the key
server generates private keys (Prpij and/or Pr
s
ij) and returns them to the peer.
The private keys of a publisher are only used upon sending a publication for signature
purposes. A publisher first encrypts the publication P with a locally generated secret
symmetric encryption algorithm with key SK (e.g., using AES). This yields the ciphertext
CTP . Then, it encrypts SK into CTSK using MPu and some local random values bi generated
for each attribute i in the publication. These random values, along with parameters of MPu,
are used to generate another series of ciphertexts {CTij}, one for each credential and covering
credentials Cij of each attribute in the publication. Due to the inclusion of the covering
credentials, any peer who subscribed to a matching criterion covering the publication will
be able to match and decrypt it.
Ciphertexts CTP , CTSK and {CTij} are sent to the pub/sub peer-to-peer overlay and
disseminated towards subscribers following containment relations between subscribers. Upon
reception of the encrypted publication, subscribers first try to decrypt SK using the set of
private keys Prsij that they obtained for subscription credentials and the set of {CTij} they
received along with the publication. Then, subscribers can attempt to use SK to decrypt the
actual publication. This decryption can only succeed if the SK obtained is correct, which
depends on the matching of the encrypted credentials. This preliminary decryption of SK
can be considered as the encrypted matching operation in the scheme. If the decrypted
publication includes a specific padding or a hash that was appended before encryption, then
the matching is positive, otherwise the obtained SK is not correct and the matching is
negative.
Practical aspects. Public key encryption is typically costlier than symmetric encryption;
this justifies encrypting the actual publication content (which might be of arbitrary size)
with a symmetric cipher and key SK, and to rely on public key encryption only for the
shorter plaintext SK itself. However, decrypting all publications using SK is still required in
order to effectively find the result of the matching operation. The decryption takes place
even on peers that will eventually not be interested in the publication.
Decrypting SK requires the subscriber to use the private keys for each credential associated
to the constraints in its subscription. The article reports a decryption complexity in O(d)
per subscription where d is the size of the attribute schema. This is simply based on the
number of multiplications done by the decryption algorithm, but does not include the cost
of other component computations.
The peer-to-peer system model where the service is provided through the interaction of
ordinary peers rather than by a set of dedicated brokers leads to the following changes.
First, subscriptions are not effectively disseminated in the system but kept at the peer that
emits them. Consequently, the cryptographic scheme does not include an actual subscription
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encryption and targets only a weak form of subscription confidentiality. Second, subscriber
peers self-organize in an overlay structured as a set of trees. Exploiting relations between
subscriptions to obtain this self-organizing overlay structure is the main cause for the weak
subscription confidentiality. Each tree in the overlay is based on containment relations
between the subscriptions, with one tree per attribute in the schema. A peer thus belongs
to multiple trees, and if it has several subscriptions with different constraints for the same
attribute, it appears at different places in the same tree. Figure 15 presents an example
attribute tree where a subscriber S2 has two nodes with credentials 01 and 001 for the
same attribute. The positions of the peers in the trees are established through connection
request messages that are encrypted under the credentials of their subscriptions. Connection
requests are gradually forwarded and decrypted by peers having matching subscriptions in
the overlay until they successfully reach the closest possible nodes based on the attribute
constraints.
We note that while the dissemination and matching of publications is decentralized, privacy
preservation and encrypted matching rely on the presence of a centralized and omniscient
trusted authority, departing from the peer-to-peer model. Implementing such an authority
as a decentralized system remains an open problem.
Security considerations. The encrypted matching operation does not need to guarantee
publication confidentiality whenever matching is positive, since a peer matching a publication
with one of its subscriptions is a valid destination of the subscription. This is a fundamental
difference with the broker-based model where the encrypted matching operation should not
disclose the publication content, even when there is a successful match.
The authors define a notion of weak subscription confidentiality and assume that leaking
information about subscription containment is acceptable between peers that are linked in
the overlay. This is a natural assumption given the nature of the connection requests and
the structure of the overlay. However, this containment support is not optional, which means
that the scheme cannot be used for applications that prohibit containment information leaks.
Relying on publication flooding to all peers in such cases would be intrinsically non-scalable,
and does not seem to be a viable alternative.
Other schemes. We conclude this section by discussing six contributions that do not
have all the features of the schemes surveyed before in this section but nevertheless have
characteristics or specificities worth mentioning.
[Srivatsa and Liu 2005; Srivatsa and Liu 2007; Srivatsa et al. 2011] develop a
pub/sub securing framework named EventGuard. The framework includes a set of function-
alities named guards, which provide an extensive set of security properties. Guards that
address confidentiality concerns focus on protecting the payload, and not the headers of
publications and subscriptions. For this, EventGuard uses an architecture similar to the
ABE technique in [Tariq et al. 2014] and [Ion et al. 2010b] that we covered earlier. This
architecture includes a key management solution that maintains a key tree per attribute.
The root of each tree is a key associated with the entire range of the attribute domain. Each
child node in the tree is a key for the corresponding partition of its parent’s domain and can
be derived from the parent key. A subscriber can derive the key to decrypt a publication
payload from a subscription key only if the publication matches the subscription. The keys
are disseminated in the system by a trusted centralized key distribution point. The key
management solution is mainly discussed in [Srivatsa and Liu 2007] for the case of numerical
attributes, under the name of PSGuard and extended in the later work. String attributes
and category hierarchies are covered in [Srivatsa et al. 2011].
For publication confidentiality and subscription confidentiality, the authors propose a
tokenization technique similar to the one in [Song et al. 2000] and previously discussed when
we surveyed [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006]. This technique restricts encrypted matching to
equality comparisons.
Author’s Version - c©ACM, 2016
Confidentiality-Preserving Publish/Subscribe: a Survey 31
[Shikfa et al. 2009] presents a scheme based on multiple layer commutative encryption
(MLCE). Multiple layer encryption encrypts already encrypted messages one or more times.
For two layers and two keys k1 and k2, the commutativity property guarantees that a
plaintext d is encrypted such that Ek2(Ek1(d)) = Ek1(Ek2(d)).
The scheme only supports equality comparisons, but on multiple attributes. It is therefore
classified in the more general class of content-based schemes, as topic-based schemes are
restricted to those that allow filtering on a single attribute only. Brokers are organized in a
chain. Each broker shares a different key with the other brokers in a set of r predecessors
and successors. Upon receiving a message, a broker removes the cryptographic layers it can
using its shared keys, performs the equality matching on what is left of the ciphertext, and
adds a new encryption layer by using a key not shared by its r− 1 following neighbors. This
allows the message to be transmitted further through the brokers while being protected
at all times by at least one encryption layer that cannot be removed. While this design
potentially fits any cryptographic algorithm with the appropriate commutativity properties,
the authors focus on the Pohlig-Hellman scheme [Pohlig and Hellman 1978].
The interest of this article within the scope of this survey comes from the particular key
distribution requirements. Brokers, publishers and subscribers need to share secret keys
with up to r neighbors. While the scheme allows choosing r as small as 2, higher values of r
make the architecture more secure against a larger number of neighboring brokers colluding
to obtain the plaintext. This feature could be interesting for more general content-based
pub/sub architectures.
[Shi et al. 2007], while not specifically discussing confidentiality in pub/sub systems,
presents another scheme similar to ABE-based solutions [Tariq et al. 2014; Ion et al. 2012].
The scheme targets multi-dimensional range queries over encrypted data and could be
adapted to pub/sub architectures in order to selectively allow brokers to access subscriptions
depending on the result of the matching operation. The architecture allows the encryption
of a query as an hyper-rectangle B, and allows its decryption only if a point of the data
lies in B. The use case considered is that of an investment broker assigned to execute a
transaction order: buy or sell stock for an investor when an event matches the query B.
The investor does not trust the broker enough for revealing his query before the order is
executed. Therefore, only a positive match implies decrypting the query. As long as the
matching fails (i.e., the order is not executed), the broker does not learn anything about the
client’s subscription.
[Pal et al. 2012] presents a pub/sub middleware solution where publishers and brokers
rely on dissemination and repository servers for publication delivery. Publishers encrypt
the publications’ payloads using ABE [Bethencourt et al. 2007], whereas the publications’
headers are used to encrypt a unique id for each publication through hidden vector encryption
(HVE) [Boneh and Waters 2007]. The encrypted ids are sent to the dissemination server,
and the encrypted payloads are stored at the repository server. The ids are then forwarded
to the subscribers, who perform the matching operation themselves. Subscriptions are
not disseminated and the scheme does not support their encryption. When an encrypted
publication header does not match any local subscription, a subscriber does not obtain any
information. When it does match, the subscriber obtains an identifier, which is then used to
retrieve the payload from the repository server. The payload is finally decrypted using ABE.
[Krishnan and Sundaram 2013] presents an approach that relies on combining several
building blocks in the areas of group algebra and boolean circuits. A first block consists in
expressing subscription constraints through boolean circuits, which can be further trans-
formed to a particular algebraic group program structure following a result obtained by
[Barrington 1986]. Publication headers are encoded in a similar group program structure.
This representation for publications and subscriptions is further blinded using an approach
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proposed by [Feige et al. 1994] for secure computation of a public function over two private
inputs. The broker finally obtains the matching result using a group multiplication operation.
Although seemingly promising in terms of expressivity, the article presents an initial work
that is evaluated only by testing equality constraints and without a conclusive result on
the variation of their number in a subscription. This is relevant considering that both the
article and the work on which is based report severe drawbacks in the solution tractability
depending on the function expressing the subscription, more precisely on the size of the
boolean circuit. The authors give several insights showing that the computational factor on
the broker side can be reduced from exponential to polynomial, but without offering any
detailed proofs.
[Crescenzo et al. 2013] presents an approach that is conceptually similar to the simple
scheme used for equality filtering originally proposed by [Song et al. 2000]. This simple
scheme was used in the context of pub/sub in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006] that we previously
discussed. A third party introduced in the communication model replaces the untrusted
broker, having the same role in the encrypted matching and being required to preserve the
same privacy guarantees. The scheme relies on the use of two-layer cryptographic pseudonyms,
which essentially are represented by a repeated application of a keyed pseudorandom function
over the constraint values in a subscription and attribute values in a publication. The protocol
is marginally different from the equality matching solution in [Raiciu and Rosenblum 2006]
including changes on the way the keys are used for the pseudorandom function, as well as
details on the key exchange phase. [Crescenzo et al. 2013] provide more rigorous formal
analysis that may be applicable for other schemes. However, the key exchange detailed
implies a high degree of coupling and increases the communication overhead between the
publisher and subscriber. The two parties must indeed know each other in advance, and
must exchange a new key for each subscription constraint, which inflicts a communication
overhead.
5. CHALLENGES AND UNEXPLORED ISSUES
We presented a survey of techniques for providing confidentiality guarantees in pub-
lish/subscribe (pub/sub) systems. We identified two main directions of research. The first
research direction focuses on the use and enforcement of security models, where confiden-
tiality provisioning is facilitated by an access control solution (or some other specialized
mechanism), controlling functions and rights for the system entities. In particular, this con-
trols the access by brokers to the fields in subscriptions and publications used for matching
and routing. Solutions in this first direction require that the brokers accessing sensitive
routable fields be trusted, forbidding their use in environments such as public clouds or
shared infrastructures. The second direction proposes domain-specific schemes performing
encrypted matching. This allows an untrusted broker to determine whether an encrypted
publication matches an encrypted subscription without the need to access the plaintexts.
In this section, we identify the main challenges and unexplored issues for confidentiality
preserving pub/sub. We believe that pub/sub systems will become an attractive option for a
large number of real-life applications once these aspects are addressed satisfactorily.
5.1. Key management
Pub/sub systems, and in particular encrypted matching schemes, introduce two requirements
for key management, and no available pub/sub system comes with a key management system
that fulfills them. Without proper key management, confidentiality cannot be provided in
practice.
The first requirement results from the decoupled nature of pub/sub communication.
Publishers do not know the destination of the publications, and subscribers do not know
their origin. As the destination of a message is unknown a priori, prior key exchange between
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communicating entities is not feasible. We saw that solutions based on attribute-based
encryption (ABE) such as [Ion et al. 2012; Tariq et al. 2010] could partially overcome this
problem by associating keys with messages instead of associating them with system nodes.
However, even with this strategy, a trusted authority is required to provide some common
information to the participants. There exists research on decentralized ABE [Lewko and
Waters 2011], which does not require such a single trusted authority, but this was not yet
applied in the area of pub/sub systems. In any case, the pub/sub solutions that rely on
ABE, use it typically for publication payload protection, which leaves key exchange for
message headers encryption as an open problem in respect to coupling. One way to address
this problem is to consider weaker decoupling assumptions, which is reasonable for many
applications. For instance, in the stock exchange scenario described in Section 1, one can
imagine that a subscriber who registers a subscription for stock quotes is part of a larger
agency that pays for the right to receive filtered publications. In this setting, there is no
association between the publisher and the particular subscriber host who will receive a
publication. Nonetheless, the stock market service is aware of the companies that paid for
subscription rights as well as their subscriber domains. In other words, the host-to-host
pub/sub communication is still decoupled, but the relationships between the domains of
the publisher and subscriber are known. In this loosely coupled setting, it is possible to
adapt standard key management solutions for secure group communication. An example of
secure group management protocol is OFT (One-way Function Trees) [Sherman and McGrew
2003], suggested for pub/sub in [Bacon et al. 2008]. Secure group key management is a
complex research area spanning a variety of techniques and protocol architectures [Rafaeli
and Hutchison 2003; Zou et al. 2005], and as such is beyond the scope of this survey. This
being said, we believe that adapting secure group communication for pub/sub systems is
promising and should be studied further.
The second requirement is the need to refresh encryption keys. Key updates are needed
when there are changes in the client trust, e.g., when a host using the current key is corrupted
and must be evicted from the system. Periodic key refreshing is also necessary to increase
the resilience of the system to brute-force attacks. In content-based pub/sub, key updates
introduce an important challenge: the invalidation of stored subscriptions when a new key
replaces an old key. All subscriptions stored by brokers in untrusted domains are encrypted
with the old key. As a result, they can no longer be matched against publications encrypted
with the new key. A naive solution would require that all subscribers re-encrypt their
previous subscriptions with the new key, and resubmit each of them to the brokers. This
presents several major drawbacks. First, it ties the completion of a key update phase to the
network layer capabilities; when a large amount of subscriptions require resubmission, the key
update phase can become prohibitively long. The quality of service is also affected: handling
subscriptions registration at the brokers results in higher load and network usage, which
might ultimately impact the matching efficiency and increase the notification delays. Another
downside is that it forces subscribers to store their set of previous subscriptions. Typically,
a pub/sub service offers dependability guarantees (e.g., brokers storing subscriptions can
have replicas, or even run more complex mechanisms handling recovery after failures).
If subscribers are also required to redundantly store subscriptions, they might need to
develop or pay for another reliable storage service to handle failures. An appealing solution
to this problem would be to develop extensions to existing encrypted matching schemes
allowing secure re-encryption directly at the brokers, or to develop novel schemes supporting
such a feature. Such re-encryption solutions should however not impair the security of the
scheme, i.e., the re-encryption token provided to brokers in untrusted domains shall not
leak information about the original key, the new key, or the subscriptions themselves. We
note that the problem of re-encrypting elements stored in untrusted domains is also present
in other contexts. For encrypted databases [Popa et al. 2012], encrypted data must be
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re-encrypted upon a key change, e.g., to prevent an evicted client from being able to further
query the data.
5.2. Confidentiality, performance and functional limitations
Encrypted matching techniques impose a performance/confidentiality tradeoff. In particular,
the matching operation is significantly more costly and slower than plaintext matching.
As we have detailed previously, some encrypted matching schemes might also prevent
from determining containment relations between subscriptions. This restricts the use of
efficient structures such as containment-based posets described in Section 2.1. The lack of
support for containment determination (or the possibility to decide whether to support
it or not) can be a feature of the scheme, as the ability to determine containment may
actually pose a threat to confidentiality by allowing to group similar subscriptions together.
This breaks indistinguishability and can allow determining the nature of a subscription
based on statistical knowledge of its definition domain. One possible way to overcome
the resulting performance limitation is to rely on non-sensitive (and thus non-encrypted)
fields in subscriptions to determine containment relations. Another approach is to augment
encrypted subscriptions and publications with compact structures allowing to pre-filter
subscriptions cheaply. The approach in [Barazzutti et al. 2012; Barazzutti et al. 2015]
proposes to augment subscriptions and publications with Bloom filters [Broder et al. 2002]
encoding equality constraints for subscriptions and attributes values for publications. By
allowing group membership comparisons, the filters allow knowing when a publication is
sure not to match a given subscription. This approach allows to discard a large fraction
of subscriptions without using the costly encrypted matching function. The Bloom filters
raise the power of an attacker observing encrypted subscriptions in untrusted domains. The
studies in [Mercier et al. 2013; Barazzutti et al. 2015] evaluate this power and propose
solutions (e.g., Bloom filter truncation) to make it weak enough to be practically useful.
Improving the performance of encrypted matching algorithms remains an important research
problem.
Besides the unfavorable confidentiality/performance tradeoff of the existing encrypted
matching schemes, there are also limitations in the expressiveness of the supported encrypted
subscriptions, which handle mostly numerical values. Strings constraints are only supported
by a few schemes, and generally limited to prefix matching. Some schemes do not support
range constraints for encrypted fields. This limits the schemes to a hybrid expressive power,
between that of topic-based and that of full-fledged content-based models. We believe that a
promising path to overcome these issues is to adapt other techniques developed for secure
databases [Popa et al. 2012] or cryptography [Boneh and Waters 2007].
5.3. Attack model limitations and other security aspects
Most of the techniques using encrypted matching consider confidentiality threats in a passive
honest-but-curious fashion. In some practical scenarios, malicious entities might actively
attack the pub/sub system. For instance, a malicious subscriber can try to corrupt several
brokers running on some untrusted public cloud and increase the power of its attacks through
the collusion of entities under its control. In our motivating example, collusion could also take
the form of two hospitals trying to access data outside their respective domains. Although
some of the schemes presented in this survey are resilient to some forms of active attacks
and can somewhat mitigate collusion (e.g., [Ion et al. 2012; Choi et al. 2010]), overall the
resilience against active attacks is currently poorly understood and should be studied further.
The security models overviewed in Section 3 are more flexible, since they are not typically
constrained to a specific cryptographic algorithm and can use classic schemes proven secure
for a wider range of scenarios – but they obviously have the major drawback of not allowing
filtering against sensitive fields in untrusted domains.
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While confidentiality is the focus of this survey, we briefly describe other security aspects
that apply to pub/sub systems. They require attack models that generally complement the
one considered in the literature.
First, integrity relates to two distinct properties: message integrity and origin in-
tegrity [Bishop 2002]. Message integrity is enforced when unauthorized modifications to
the exchanged data can be detected. Origin integrity (or authenticity) is the property of
ensuring trustworthiness in the identity of the originator of a message. When the attack
model considers honest-but-curious brokers, both properties can be guaranteed for end-to-end
messages using classical techniques such as computing and appending HMAC values to
exchanged messages. When the threat model considers stronger attackers such as malicious
brokers, ensuring the integrity of subscriptions stored at the brokers, or the legitimacy of
received publications, requires using specific techniques. [Chang and Meling 2012] classifies
the malicious threats faced by pub/sub systems.
Second, availability is the property of ensuring continuous service or a certain quality of
service to the clients under the presence of faults. Such faults can either be crash faults or
result from malicious actions like denial-of-service attacks (DoS). For the former, [Chang
et al. 2014] presents P2S, a replicated broker model using state machine replication based on
the Paxos consensus protocol. It considers a crash fault model for brokers with no malicious
or byzantine behavior. For the latter, DoS attacks are a widely addressed security topic
in distributed systems, but less often for pub/sub architectures. [Wun et al. 2007] gives a
taxonomy of such attacks in pub/sub systems and potential directions for counteracting
them. Most often, DoS attacks are referenced as a side case or along other security properties
ensured in more general pub/sub security models [Bacon et al. 2008; Srivatsa and Liu 2005].
Finally, subscriptions anonymity against colluding subscribers and brokers was studied
in [Rao et al. 2013]. There is little work done on these important topics in the context of
secure pub/sub, and we think that they should be studied further.
5.4. Toward security models with encrypted matching
To conclude our presentation, we emphasize that given the current state of research, providing
confidentiality in a pub/sub architecture without encrypted matching is much easier than by
using encrypted matching, since well-established security models can be used and thoroughly
tested algorithms can be deployed. Furthermore, the proposed solutions in this direction
generally come with a more holistic approach to security aspects such as key management,
role management, etc. However, without encrypted matching, confidentiality threats force us
to significantly decrease the routing capabilities at the very core of content-based pub/sub
systems, that is, in the set of brokers deployed on public and untrusted infrastructure.
Our primary conclusion is thus that research should advance towards integrating encrypted
matching techniques into complete security solutions for pub/sub systems, taking into
account its specific aspects like trust relations, key distribution and management, and
performance impact. We believe that only then will confidentiality-preserving pub/sub offer
a significant advantage over more traditional communication systems based on coupled
but secure communication. As briefly discussed in Section 4, functional encryption might
serve as basis for constructing a formal encrypted matching framework. Following the
syntax from [Boneh et al. 2011], the matching in a pub/sub system could be formalized as
F : S × P → {true, false} where S and P are the sets of subscriptions and publications.
An encrypted matching scheme would then be formally defined as a series of algorithms,
such as key generation, subscription encryption, publication encryption, and matching that
permits obtaining the functionality F from the encrypted results. Although this syntax can
be easily derived from functional encryption, a rigorous and complete framework must take
into account the particularities of encrypted matching, which have never been considered in
the literature. First, functional encryption is specifically defined for schemes based on public-
key cryptography, which is only a subset of encrypted matching solutions. Second, it does
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not consider pub/sub constraints like encrypting two types of messages (subscriptions and
publications) resulting in different ciphertexts. Third, the objective of predicate encryption,
the main subclass of functional encryption, is to decrypt the ciphertext (matching is a
precondition in this process). This fails to capture the difference in trust between the entity
that performs the matching (the broker) and the entity that decrypts (the subscriber).
Another important avenue of research is to bridge the gap between encrypted matching and
other secure processing techniques like garbled circuits [Yao 1986; Bellare et al. 2012; Zahur
et al. 2015] and homomorphic encryption [Gentry 2010]. The development of these techniques,
like confidentiality-preserving pub/sub, is driven by the advent of cloud computing. It however
goes well beyond the operational need of matching between publications and subscriptions in
a pub/sub service model, by aiming at performing general processing on encrypted data, such
as evaluating a function, without leaking sensitive information. Due to its more restricted
functional nature, encrypted matching has much lower costs than even the most practical
instances of homomorphic encryption, and it is an open problem to adapt the latter to
the particularities of pub/sub (where only routing is required by the broker rather than
decrypting, for instance). We expect that encrypted matching schemes and homomorphic
encryption algorithms will continue to co-exist and evolve independently in the near future.
However, considering the amount of resources currently devoted to homomorphic encryption
and other related techniques, developers of encrypted matching schemes should pay close
attention to new developments that might be applicable in pub/sub settings. One should
finally point out the recent developments around trusted execution environments like Intel
SGX [SGX 2016] that support secure execution in the cloud, and may also play a role in the
development of efficient yet trustworthy confidentiality-preserving pub/sub systems.
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